China
Highlights So What? The late-cycle rally faces non-trivial political hurdles. Why? The rally is based on a too-sanguine view of the Fed, China, and the trade war. Other issues – like Brexit and the U.S. border showdown – are also problematic. Venezuela still has the potential to push oil prices sharply upwards. Feature All is well. Global equities are on the path of recovery, as should be the case at the end of an economic cycle. The U.S. S&P 500 has gained 16% since the bottom on December 24, with healthy technicals suggesting a breakout is ahead (Chart 1). The S&P 500 may be entering one of its typical late-cycle rallies, which tend to be the second best-performing decile of a bull market (Chart 2).1 Meanwhile, emerging market equities and currencies are outperforming developed market peers (Chart 3), a reversal from 2018 Chart 1Late Cycle Rally Ahead? Chart 3...As Does Current Global Outperformance Typically, global risk assets outperform American risk assets at the end of an economic cycle. While institutional investors can use these rallies to lighten the load ahead of a recession, most investors cannot afford to miss such a rally. As such, BCA (and others) are calling for investors to play what is expected to be a yearlong rally in global risk assets and the S&P 500. Our view at BCA Geopolitical Strategy is more cautious, perhaps because it is informed by a methodological bias rooted in geopolitics. We believe that the reversal in U.S. outperformance relative to global risk assets rests on three pillars: The Federal Reserve remains dovish throughout 2019; China begins a major reflationary effort; The U.S.-China tariff truce results in a trade deal. In addition, a consensus is emerging that a “no deal” Brexit will not occur, that U.S. polarization cannot get worse, and that President Trump eschews foreign interventionism. While we hold a nuanced view on each of these assertions, the mix is far less bullish than investors may think. We see a witches’ brew of factors that is murky at best and bearish at worst. The Three Pillars Of The Bullish View Before we turn to geopolitics, let us examine the three pillars underpinning the bullish view. Our colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, remains bullish on the U.S. economy and expects the Fed to resume hiking rates by mid-year.2 The Conference Board’s Leading Credit Index remains in expansionary territory (Chart 4). While business capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to robust spending plans over the next few quarters (Chart 5). Chart 4Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Chart 5Capex Plans Still Solid It is no surprise that the BCA Fed Monitor continues to suggest that “tighter monetary policy is required” (Chart 6). This is a far cry from 2016, when our indicator was in deeply “tightening” territory and the Fed paused for 12 months. If we compare 2019 to 2016, it is difficult to see how the market expectation of 4.72 bps of rate cuts will occur over the next 12 months (Chart 7). Of the three components that make up the BCA Fed Monitor, only the financial conditions have fallen into “easing required” territory (Chart 8), and they are already shifting back to “tightening required” territory with the stock market rally underway (Chart 9). Chart 6A Hawkish Fed Is Needed Chart 8BCA Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Policy Chart 9Financial Conditions Starting To Ease In addition, in 2016 the Fed was not contracting its balance sheet. Today it is doing so, although the pace has moderated. As such, the Fed’s rate hike pause is occurring amidst an ongoing effort to normalize monetary policy and to transfer rate risks back to the private sector. By chance, this is also occurring at a time when the Treasury Department must issue more debt to cover a larger deficit, a process that could significantly pull U.S. rates higher and, by extension, yields on assets further down the risk curve. This would be a particular problem for global risk assets given the exposure of several EM economies to dollar-denominated debt. The bottom line for investors is that a rate hike pause is not a pause in the overall hawkish policy of the U.S. Fed, which acts as a global central bank. The fall in the amount of dollars available for the international financial system acts as a brake on growth. Over the past 10 years, each time money supply growth fell below the loan uptake of the U.S. corporate sector, BCA’s Global Industrial Activity Nowcast, BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator, Korean exports, and global export prices all deteriorated considerably (Chart 10). Chart 10Deteriorating Excess Liquidity Hurts Global Growth Our muted view on Chinese reflation is unnecessary to repeat here. There is no doubt that Chinese policymakers are stimulating the economy, but the question is whether they are willing to pull the credit lever as aggressively as they have done in the past (Chart 11).So far, all of the evidence we have reviewed point to a cautious effort to stabilize growth, not reflate the entire planetary economy as Beijing did in 2016. If our BCA House View on the Fed is correct, a tepid Chinese effort to stimulate the domestic economy will fall short of lighting the flame of a global risk rally in 2019. Chart 11Compare Any Stimulus To Previous Efforts The BCA China Play Index, which in the past has tracked EM vs. DM equity outperformance, is sending mixed signals today (Chart 12). Enthusiasm for global risk assets has not been confirmed by the most China-sensitive plays. Chart 12Mixed Signals From China-Sensitive Plays Finally, there is the trade truce that should produce a trade deal. The logic is clear: President Trump sets aside the political constraints working against a deal and focuses on ensuring that he wins 2020 by avoiding a recession. The near bear market in the S&P 500 was a game changer that focused the White House on averting any further downside to markets and the economy from the trade war. But if the current rally proves that the selloff in December was a temporary pullback, the White House may be emboldened to play hard-to-get with China. After all, the electorate is generally supportive of getting tough on China (Chart 13) and there is no demand from either Trump voters or Democrats for a quick deal. The Fed pause and lower oil prices also give Trump some space to push negotiations a bit harder. Already there are leaks from the negotiations that the U.S. is asking for a lot from China, which could prolong the talks. This includes genuine structural changes to the economic relationship that would address long-standing U.S. concerns of forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and foreign investor access to the Chinese domestic market. It also includes U.S. demands that these changes be verifiable and enforceable. China is likely to balk at some of the U.S. demands, particularly if the U.S. is indeed pushing for regular reviews of China’s progress, a condition that implicitly creates a hierarchy between the two economies and would thus represent a loss of face for Beijing.3 Table 1 presents our latest expectations of where the U.S. and China will be on March 1. We assign only 10% each to “black and white” outcomes, a “Grand Compromise” and “No deal, with major escalation.” The remaining 80% is divided between “mushy” outcomes, including a 25% probability that negotiations simply continue. Table 1Updated U.S.-China Trade War Probabilities How would the market react to such uncertain outcomes? We think that almost anything other than a “Grand Compromise” would be greeted with limited relief, if not outright market correction. A vaguely positive meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi, and a memorandum of understanding, would not remove long-term risks in the relationship, especially if the parallel “tech war” is not resolved. On top of the ongoing U.S.-China negotiations, there is one remaining trade issue that investors should keep in mind: auto tariffs. The Section 232 investigation into whether auto imports are a national security threat is ongoing and U.S. authorities are expected to present their conclusions on February 17. We fear that the Trump administration could still stage a surprise and impose tariffs on auto imports. This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production within the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. An extended truce with China could provide the opportunity. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but the timing of this decision could upset the market’s perception of Trump’s commitment to free trade once again. Bottom Line: The conventional narrative is that global markets are experiencing a late-cycle rally, one that is worth playing given its usual duration and amplitude. This view rests on three pillars: that the Fed has backed off from tightening, that China is stimulating in earnest, and that the trade deal will produce a definitive outcome. We fear that all three pillars are shaky. First, the Fed is not easing. Its balance sheet contraction process, which is ongoing, is a form of tightening. And the U.S. economy remains healthy. As such, the expectation of a 12-month Fed pause is overly optimistic. Second, China is stimulating, but only tepidly. Third, “black and white,” definitive outcomes are unlikely in the U.S.-China negotiations. In fact, more protectionism could be around the corner if U.S.-China tech issues continue to flare or if the U.S. announces the conclusion of its investigation into auto imports. Geopolitical Factors To Monitor Aside from shaky pillars, markets will also have to contend with several uncertain geopolitical processes this year. While we are not necessarily bearish on each one, we are concerned that the collective investment community is overly bullish. Take Brexit. We agree with the conventional view that the chances of a no-deal Brexit outcome are below 10%. Political betting markets have only priced in an actual exit on March 29, which is in ink in British legislation, at just above 30% (Chart 14). Chart 14Online Betters Expect A Brexit Delay The problem is not with the conventional view but with its timing. While Prime Minister Theresa May will ultimately be forced to extend the Article 50 deadline, it may take a lot of brinkmanship and eleventh hour negotiations to do so. Getting from here – collective bullishness – to there – an actual extension of Article 50 – may require a downturn in GBP/USD or other U.K. assets. Furthermore, several scenarios could produce a downturn in GBP/USD (Diagram 1). For example, the Labour Party remains neck-and-neck with the Tories in the polls, despite being led by the most left-leaning leader since the 1970s. Although a new election that produces a Labour government would likely reduce the odds of Brexit eventually occurring, it would raise the odds of Corbyn pursuing unorthodox economic policy while also trying to negotiate his own version of Brexit with the EU. Diagram 1Brexit: The Path To Salvation Remains Fraught With Dangers The point is that it is tough to recommend that investors close their eyes and buy GBP/USD, no matter how cheap the currency may look, unless one has a very long time horizon and a high threshold for pain. The second issue where we take a more nuanced position is the ongoing U.S. executive-legislative standoff over the border. The government shutdown is only on pause until February 15. The House Democrats are demanding that a solution be found by Friday, February 8 if it is to be voted on in time. Meanwhile President Trump’s popularity is in the doldrums (Chart 15). His supporters note that President Reagan was even less popular at this point in his term, but that is because unemployment hit 10.4% in January 1983 (Chart 16). The grave risk for President Trump is that he is as unpopular as Reagan, even though unemployment is at 4% and the U.S. economy is on fire. Chart 15President Trump Is Unpopular... Chart 16...And It Can't Be Blamed On Unemployment As such, the real risk is not another shutdown, but rather political dysfunction in Congress that imperils the legislative process. The current two-year budget deal, which raised spending levels in January 2018, is set to expire when the FY2019 ends. Democrats and Trump have to come to an agreement to avert the “stimulus cliff” expected in 2020 (Chart 17). If they cannot conclude the border issue and the FY2019 appropriations, then Trump may declare a national emergency (or act unilaterally in other ways) and spark a new conflict with the courts. He could also threaten not to raise the debt ceiling in spring or summer. This is not an atmosphere in which a FY2020 deal looks very easy. Chart 17Stimulus Cliff Ahead Ultimately, we expect Democrats to succumb to the pressure from their voters for more spending. But a total failure to cooperate is a risk. Furthermore, the greatest political risk in the U.S. is that the 2020 election will not be contested on the same issues as in 2016: trade and immigration. Instead, income inequality is rearing its head, as Democratic candidates jostle for attention and as they test various messages on focus groups. If income inequality catches fire as the issue of 2020, we will know it soon. And it may begin to impact the markets as Democrats begin to campaign on, for instance, reversing President Trump’s income tax cuts. While the market may ignore headline election risks for some time, we do not think that non-financial corporates can do the same. Any hint that President Trump’s pro-business policies will be reversed could send shivers down the spines of CEOs and negatively impact capex intentions, hurting the real economy well before the next election. Finally, there is the issue of foreign policy. President Trump has abandoned his maximum pressure tactic on Iran and has begun withdrawing the remaining troops in the Middle East. These trends are likely to continue in 2019 as President Trump focuses on China and lesser issues like Venezuela. There is one important area of alignment between him and the defense and intelligence community, notwithstanding recent scuffles: less focus on the Middle East means more focus on Asia and specifically China. However, President Trump is facing a dilemma. Despite an extraordinary economic performance, his popularity remains in the doldrums. When faced with similar situations in the past, presidents far more orthodox than Trump have sought relevance abroad, by means of military interventions. A convenient opportunity has presented itself in Venezuela, where a revolution against Chavismo could give the U.S. an opening to intervene. On paper, we see how such a scenario could look appealing for a quick, and relatively painless, intervention. The problem is that it could also get messy and, in the analysis of BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy, raise oil prices to nearly $100 per barrel by mid-year if a total loss of Venezuelan production ensues (Chart 18). This is a non-negligible risk. Chart 18A Venezuela Collapse Could Send Brent Crude Prices Toward $100/Bbl Bottom Line: Geopolitical risks still abound. We are not alarmist. However, there is little reason to believe that Brexit, U.S. polarization, U.S.-China tensions, or a potential U.S. intervention in Venezuela will end painlessly for the market. An unpopular U.S. president is seeking to remain relevant and a global populist wave is continuing to create unorthodox and anti-establishment policy prescriptions. Given that the current rally is supported by three shaky pillars, any one of these geopolitical risks could catalyze a relapse, the history of late-cycle rallies be damned. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Late-Cycle Blues,” dated October 29, 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Patient Jay,” dated January 18, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. demands regular review of China trade reform,” dated January 18, 2019, available at reuters.com. Geopolitical Calendar
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Chinese reflation, the ongoing global capex upcycle, and the Fed induced cap on the greenback with the knock-on effect of higher commodity prices, all signal that it still pays to overweight S&P cyclicals at the expense of S&P defensives. Sustained EM stock outperformance, a soft U.S. dollar, improving semi equipment operating metrics, along with compelling relative valuations and technicals, all suggest that there are high odds that the recent semi equipment run up has more upside. Recent Changes There are no changes in the portfolio this week. Feature The SPX consolidated the 350 point advance since the Christmas Eve trough last week, setting the stage for a durable advance in the coming months. The Fed stood pat last Wednesday, and signaled a much more dovish policy stance going forward. Chairman Powell was clearly humbled by last December’s convulsing equity market and abrupt tightening in financial conditions. On that front, in the latest FOMC statement the explicit mention of patience is significant: “the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate”. A definitively more dovish Fed, which will help restrain the greenback, remains one of the three key catalysts for a durable equity market advance as we have highlighted in recent research.1 Encouragingly, our proprietary Equity Capitulation Indicator (ECI) has bottomed at two standard deviations below the historical mean (Chart 1). Over the past two decades, such a depressed level in our ECI has marked previous equity market troughs including the early-2016, 2011, 2002 and 1998 iterations. Only the GFC episode was lower, falling to three standard deviations below the mean. Clearly the late-December selling frenzy registers as another investor capitulation point and, if history at least rhymes, more gains are in store for the broad equity market. Chart 1Capitulation Chart 2 shows some other measures of breadth that corroborate our ECI’s message: investors hit the panic button and exited equities in droves in Q4. The upshot is that with selling exhausted, stocks can now stage a durable recovery as long as profits continue to expand. As a reminder, the continuation of the earnings juggernaut is the second key catalyst we identified two weeks ago.2 Midway through earnings season, SPX EPS have held up well with growth approaching 16%. For calendar 2019 we expect mid-single digit EPS growth in line with the signal from our macro driven S&P 500 EPS growth model (please refer to Chart 4 from the mid-January Weekly Publication).3 Chart 2Selling Is Exhausted A positive resolution to the U.S./China trade spat is the third catalyst we highlighted recently in order for equities to break out to fresh all-time highs.4 Related to this, China’s reflation efforts are equally important. On that front, news of quasi QE from the PBOC suggests that the Chinese authorities remain committed to injecting liquidity into their economy.5 Already, the PBOC balance sheet, with over $5.5tn in assets, is expanding anew. Empirical evidence suggests that SPX momentum and the ebb and flow of the PBOC balance sheet are joined at the hip, and the current message is positive (second panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Heed The PBoC Message Beyond the PBOC balance sheet expansion, the Chinese six-month credit impulse is also in a sling shot recovery. This Chinese credit backdrop is enticing and moves more or less in tandem with the SPX six-month impulse (top panel, Chart 4). Chart 4Reflating Away Two forces explain these relationships. First, China’s rise to become the second largest economy in the world along with its insatiable appetite for commodities and durable goods. Second, 40% of S&P 500 sales are international and an increasing share now originates in emerging markets in general and in China in particular. Keep in mind that the S&P cyclicals/defensives ratio is not only a high beta play on the SPX itself (top panel, Chart 3), but also an S&P global versus domestic gauge. Thus, both of these Chinese indicators also enjoy a positive correlation with the cyclicals vs. defensives tilt (bottom panels, Charts 3 & 4). With that in mind, this week we are drilling deeper into why we continue to prefer S&P cyclicals over S&P defensives and also highlight a highly cyclical index we went overweight in mid-December that has gone parabolic. Double Down On Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Early-October 2017 marks the initiation of our cyclical vs. defensive preference. Initially, this tilt jumped and peaked in mid-2018 returning 18% since inception. Since then, it has given up all of those gains and then some before troughing with the market on Christmas Eve, suffering a 6% drop since inception. Currently, the ratio has moved full circle and is back to where it was when we first recommended this portfolio bent (Chart 5). Chart 5Full Circle Should investors commit capital to this tilt at this stage of the cycle and given the current global macro backdrop? The short answer is yes. Charts 3 & 4 show that China’s reflation efforts and the fate of the S&P cyclicals/defensives ratio are closely correlated. In addition to the PBOC’s expanding balance sheet and rising Chinese credit impulse, Chinese monetary easing also benefits S&P cyclicals at the expense of S&P defensives. The Chinese reserve requirement ratio (RRR) has plummeted to the lowest point since the GFC and Chinese interest rates are also plumbing multi-year lows (RRR shown inverted, top panel, Chart 6). Chart 6China Flashing Green Tack on a resurgent currency with the CNY briefly breaking 6.70 with the U.S. dollar, and factors are falling into place for a playable rally in the cyclicals/defensive ratio. Likely, the Chinese are trying to appease President Trump by underpinning the yuan, but the Fed’s recent more dovish stance on interest rate hikes is also pushing the greenback lower. Taken together, this is a boon for the commodity exposed U.S. cyclicals that also garner a significant share of their sales from abroad (bottom panel, Chart 6). Commodity prices troughed last September, staying true to their leading properties and have been in recovery mode ever since (top panel, Chart 7). Now that the Fed has capped the U.S. dollar, more gains are in store for commodities and that is a boon for commodity producers’ top line growth prospects. Chart 7Capex Remains Healthy The demand backdrop is also enticing at the current stage of the business cycle, not only domestically, but also in China. Capital outlays remain upbeat and despite some recent turbulence, U.S. capex intentions are near multi-year highs (third panel, Chart 7). In China, recent piece meal fiscal easing announcements are far from negligible; already infrastructure spending has jumped after contracting late last year (second panel, Chart 7). Were these announcements to get supplemented by a bigger and more comprehensive package, then commodity-levered equities will excel further. A look at the relative balance sheet health of cyclicals versus defensives is revealing. Cyclicals are paying down debt and their cash flow continues to improve, still recovering from the late-2015/early 2016 global manufacturing recession. On the flipside, defensives are piling on debt. All four safe haven sectors have been degrading their balance sheets (relative net debt-to-EBITDA shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 8). Interest coverage sends a similar message: cyclicals are in excellent health both in absolute terms and compared with defensives (top panel, Chart 8). Chart 8B/S Improvement Continues Sell-side analysts have not yet taken notice of the macro tide that is turning in favor of cyclicals over defensives. Relative forward profit growth has collapsed to nil and net EPS revisions are at previous nadirs (fourth & fifth panels, Chart 9). Chart 9Oversold And Unloved In sum, if our thesis pans out that China will continue to reflate, global capex will remain vibrant, the greenback will drift lower (U.S. dollar shown inverted, top panel, Chart 9) courtesy of a dovish Fed that will push the broad commodity complex higher, then a significant valuation rerating looms for the cyclicals/defensives tilt (second panel, Chart 9). Bottom Line: Continue to the prefer S&P cyclicals to S&P defensives. We also reiterate our recent long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade.6 Semi Equipment: Buy Into Strength In mid-December we boosted the S&P semi equipment index to overweight from underweight and since then this niche chip subindex has outperformed the broad market by 17%.7 Semi equipment stocks are high beta (bottom panel, Chart 10) and, while we are recommending to buy into strength, from a portfolio risk management perspective, today we are also setting a trailing stop at the 10% return mark in order to protect profits in this tactical (three-to-six month time horizon) position. Chart 10Buy Into Strength... These high-octane highly-cyclical tech stocks move in lockstep with other volatile asset classes. Rebounding emerging market (EM) stocks and FX confirm the S&P semi equipment breakout, and signal additional gains in the coming months (Chart 11). Not only do they share the high-beta status, but also semi equipment stocks garner 90% of their sales outside U.S. shores and 21% of total revenues come from China (please refer to Table 3 in our December 17, 2018 Weekly Report). Thus, the tight inverse correlation with the greenback and positive correlation with the outperforming EM stocks comes as no surprise (Chart 11). Chart 11...But Expect Heightened Vol Importantly, Taiwan and Korea are chip manufacturing hubs and semi equipment stocks are levered plays on the macro backdrops of these two economies. Recent data suggests that a turn is in the making in two key indicators in these countries, respectively. Taiwanese tech capex has likely troughed at a depressed level (middle panel. Chart 12), and Korean electronic components manufacturing capacity is now contracting for the first time since late-1997 (bottom panel, Chart 12). The latter is significant as this abrupt and sizable reining in of productive capacity will soon help arrest the fall in chip prices, which serves as an excellent pricing power proxy for the semi equipment industry. Chart 12Green Shoots Historically, relative forward profit growth and DRAM price momentum are joined at the hip. Therefore, were DRAM prices to exit deflation on the back of constrained Korean capacity, that would be a boon for relative profit prospects (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 13Analysts Have Thrown In The Towel Despite these marginal positive developments, sell-side analysts’ pessimism reigns supreme. Industry revenue and profit growth expectations trail the broad market by a wide margin and net EPS revisions remain as bad as they get. The upshot is that these lowered profit and sales growth bars will be easy to surpass in 2019 (Chart 13). With regard to technicals and valuations, oversold conditions bounced, as we posited in mid-December using history as a guide, but still remain depressed (middle panel, Chart 14). Valuations are compelling with the S&P semi equipment forward P/E trading at a roughly 40% discount to the overall market (fourth panel, Chart 13). Chart 14Technicals Remain Depressed Finally, earnings season has revealed that the bifurcated semiconductor market has staying power with semi equipment stocks (we are overweight) outperforming their ailing semi producer brethren (we remain underweight). Netting it out, sustained EM stock outperformance, a soft U.S. dollar, improving industry operating metrics, along with compelling relative valuations and technicals, all suggest that there are high odds that the recent semi equipment run up has more upside. Bottom Line: Maintain the overweight stance in the S&P semi equipment index for a while longer, but set a trailing stop at the 10% relative return mark in order to protect profits in this tactical (three-to-six month time horizon) position. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Catharsis” dated January 14, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting 2019 Earnings” dated January 22, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Bloomberg Article, “PBOC Sets Up Swap Tool to Aid Bank Capital via Perpetual Bonds” dated January 24, 2019, available at www.bloomberg.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Trader’s Paradise” dated January 28, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, “Signal Vs. Noise” dated December 17, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
With high conviction, our answer to this question is no. Panel 1 of above chart shows the percentile rank of the two most cyclical components of the LKI. From 2010 to early-2018, electricity production and railway freight volume moved closely together, with…
Highlights Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” remains weak, and the beneficial trade front-running effect that has supported some of China’s macro data over the past year is beginning to wane. Our "earnings recession" model for Chinese investable stocks suggests that a trade deal alone is not enough to prevent a contraction in earnings growth over the coming year. A meaningful rebound in credit relative to GDP would also be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. An overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. The equity market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March if trade talks continue to make progress, but will face (potentially severe) headwinds thereafter until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. Feature China’s macro data remains at the forefront of investor attention, and December’s updates did not provide market participants with much comfort. Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” deteriorated anew in December after a shallow three-month rise (Chart 1), driven by a currency-driven retracement in monetary conditions, as well as slowing growth in both M3 and adjusted total social financing (TSF). The flow of adjusted TSF relative to GDP technically ticked higher in December, but only because of a material slowdown in nominal GDP growth from 9.6% in Q3 to 8.1% in Q4 (Chart 2). This decline in nominal GDP means that it has retraced 70% of its rise from 2015 to 2017. Chart 1A Relapse In Our Leading Indicator For China's Old Economy Chart 2A 70% Retracement In Chinese Nominal GDP Growth On the housing front, sales volume growth ticked slightly higher but remains negative (and well below the pace of construction growth), and pledged supplementary lending from the PBOC, a factor that we have identified as a core driver of China’s housing market since 2015,1 decelerated further. Finally, December’s trade data was uniformly negative, with import and export growth decelerating 6-7 percentage points even on a smoothed basis, depending on whether measured in U.S. dollars or local currency. Revisiting The Measurement Of China’s “Old Economy” One notable exception to the weak data was the Bloomberg Li Keqiang index (LKI) itself, which rose from 8.4 in November to 9.3 in December. Our alternative LKI rose to exactly the same level, closing the gap with Bloomberg’s measure that had existed earlier this year (Chart 3). Chart 3Our Coincident Measures Of The Old Economy Are Trending Higher... In fact, the LKI has been providing a different message than our LKI leading indicator for several months, and the apparent uptrend in the series raises the question of whether the Chinese economy is actually strengthening rather than weakening. With high conviction, our answer to this question is no. As we have highlighted in previous reports, our view is that the gap can be explained by the (anomalous and only temporary) positive impact that the trade war has had on economic activity since March last year, as Chinese exporters rushed to front-load the production and shipment of goods to the U.S. in advance of the imposition of tariffs. Panel 1 of Chart 4 makes this point explicitly, by showing the percentile rank of the two most cyclical components of the LKI. From 2010 to early-2018, electricity production and railway freight volume moved closely together, with the former leading the latter somewhat from 2017 to early-2018. While the trade war-driven bounce in electricity production has since rolled off, railway cargo volume remains elevated and is only now rolling over. December’s extremely poor trade data suggests that a material further decline is likely in Q1 of this year. Chart 4...Because Of A (Temporarily) Beneficial Trade War Effect Panel 2 shows that bank lending, the third component of the LKI, has begun to pick up over the past few months. However, this reflects, at least in part, the goal of policymakers to shrink the size of shadow banking in the economy and reorient the provision of credit back to traditional financial institutions (Chart 5). A sustainable rise in bank loan growth that overwhelms a shrinking shadow banking sector will almost certainly show up in our preferred measure of aggregate credit growth (adjusted total social financing), which for now remains in a clear downtrend. From a bigger picture perspective, it is worth revisiting why we focus on the LKI at all. Our use of the index to represent China’s investment-relevant economic activity dates back to a November 2017 Special Report,2 in which we noted that it correlated well with China’s nominal import growth and led the growth in earnings for the MSCI China index ex-technology. Real GDP growth, by contrast, has shown barely any cyclicality over the past four years in the face of large changes in Chinese import growth and the prices of China-related assets (Chart 6). This underscores that aggregate Chinese real GDP is not, by and large, investment-relevant. Chart 5A Stunning Collapse In Shadow Banking Activity Chart 6Chinese Real GDP Growth Is Not Relevant For Investors What can we infer about the trend in China’s old economy if the LKI is combined with other closely correlated measures of investment-relevant economic activity? Panel 1 of Chart 7 answers this question by presenting the standardized LKI alongside standardized nominal import growth and nominal manufacturing output, the measure of Chinese coincident activity preferred by BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service. Panel 2 of the chart shows an equally-weighted average of all three measures alongside our leading indicator for the LKI. We note four key observations from Chart 7: Chart 7China's Investment-Relevant Economic Activity Is Trending Lower Since 2010, the primary trend in the LKI, nominal import growth, and nominal manufacturing output has been the same The modest uptrend in the LKI since early-2018 is not corroborated by imports or manufacturing output Economic activity in China has been stronger over the past year than our leading indicator would have suggested, even after abstracting from the anomalous uptrend in the LKI The gap between our leading indicator and China’s actual economic activity is now beginning to close. These observations support the conclusion that we reached when analyzing the components of the LKI itself: a temporary boost from trade front-running has masked an underlying slowdown over the past year. But this boost has now begun to wane, implying that actual activity will continue to slow in the coming months. Is A Trade Deal Enough To Prevent An Earnings Contraction? While most global investors would acknowledge that China’s domestic economy is slowing, the performance of China-related assets over the past year highlights that the market views the trade war with the U.S. as being at least equally important as slowing Chinese money & credit growth. Chart 8 highlights that our market-based China growth indicator did not break down until the second quarter of 2018, when the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration became a reality. The indicator’s prior resilience was in contrast to a steady deterioration in our LKI leading indicator, which peaked at the beginning of 2017. Chart 8Investors Are Largely Focused On The U.S./China Trade War The surge in the indicator since early-December underscores that investor expectations of a trade deal with the U.S. have materially improved sentiment about China’s growth profile, despite the fact that Chinese money & credit growth have yet to meaningfully improve. Given that our geopolitical strategy team assigns odds as high as 45% of a framework deal emerging by the March 1 deadline,3 how can investors gauge the net impact of an improving external outlook and still-weak domestic demand? Chart 9 illustrates one method of approaching this question, using a model of Chinese investable earnings growth that we introduced in our January 16 Special Report.4 The model is designed to predict the likelihood of a serious investable earnings contraction over the coming 12-months, and includes data on credit, trade, and forward earnings momentum as predictors. The chart shows what would have to happen to the flow of adjusted total social financing as a share of GDP in a trade deal scenario, calibrated in a way that the odds of a major earnings contraction fall to 33% (the highest historical reading of the model that did not correspond to a major earnings decline). Chart 9A Trade Deal Is Not Enough To Avoid An Earnings Recession In China The chart shows that a meaningful rebound in credit flow to GDP would be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. In short, our analysis shows that a trade deal alone is likely not enough to prevent a contraction in Chinese earnings growth over the coming year. Importantly, Chart 10 shows what this would imply for the volume of credit that would need to be created over the coming several months in order for the scenario shown in Chart 9 to come to pass (assuming an 8% growth rate in nominal GDP). The chart highlights that China would need to create approximately RMB 26 trillion in new credit over the coming 12 months (nearly US$ 4 trillion at current exchange rates), which would exceed the prior high set in late-2017 by a non-trivial amount. While this goal looks on its way to being achieved based on a 6-month annualized rate of change (panel 2), this largely reflects a one-month surge in local government bond issuance in September. Over the past 3-months, the annualized pace of credit creation has fallen well below the RMB 26 trillion mark, implying that either traditional credit growth, shadow credit, or local government bond issuance will have to pick up significantly over the coming several months in order for the domestic demand situation to stabilize. We expect this to occur, but it has not occurred yet. Chart 10China Needs To Create 26 Trillion RMB In Credit In 2019 Investment Conclusions The key conclusion of our analysis above is that an overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. We noted in our December 5 weekly report that a tactical (0-3 month) overweight was probably warranted due to the prospect of a framework trade deal with the U.S. on March 1, but Chart 9 makes it clear that an improving external demand outlook is not a sufficient basis to expect that Chinese stocks will avoid an earnings recession. In this regard, investors should conceptualize the absence of a significant pickup in the volume of credit as a “gap” in a bridge representing the market support for Chinese stocks over the course of the calendar year (Chart 11). Assuming leaks from the negotiations continue and are consistent with the agreement of a framework deal, the market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March. However, following March 1, a gap in support emerges until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. In our view, investors who go long Chinese stocks today with a 6-12 month time horizon are betting not only on the success of trade negotiations, but that this gap will close by the time that a deal is announced. This is a risky gamble given the still-relevant desire of policymakers to avoid another major credit overshoot, and as such our cyclical recommendation remains unchanged: wait. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?”, dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report “Is China Already Isolated?”, dated January 23, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “Six Questions About Chinese Stocks”, dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
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