Asset Allocation
Highlights The tactical environment is dynamic, chaotic and unpredictable. ...Chaos also brings opportunity. We must recognize and exploit opportunities when chance presents them. Look for recurring patterns to exploit.1 Feature Highlights Strategically, major commodity markets are balanced with the exception of ags, where we remain underweight on the back of record grain harvests and high stock-to-use ratios. Otherwise, broad exposure to the asset class is warranted. However, within the larger investment context, we believe tactical positioning once again will produce higher returns than strategic index exposure to commodities. Chart of the WeekTactical Positioning ##br##Rewarded In Oil Markets Supply-driven price volatility and erratic monetary policy presented commodity markets strategic and tactical opportunities in 2016, particularly in oil, where our recommendations returned an average of 95% (Chart of the Week). We remain overweight oil, expecting continued opportunities from volatile markets. Going forward, the contribution of demand-side risk to price volatility will increase. This will be evident in iron ore, steel and base metals, where the opacity of China's fiscal and monetary policy - especially re heavily indebted state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the banks that support them - in the lead-up to the Communist Party's Congress abounds. Continued adjustments by the U.S. Fed to random-walking data will again contribute to volatility, particularly in oil and gold markets. A stronger dollar resulting from continued Fed tightening will hit U.S. ag exports, and benefit competitors such as Argentina and the EU. However, uncertainty re the Trump administration's fiscal and trade policies could keep the Fed looser for longer, particularly if border-adjusted taxation favoring exports over imports is realized. Geopolitics - particularly vis-Ã -vis U.S. and China trade and military policy - will become more important if America tilts toward dirigisme, i.e., actively managing its economy by adjusting taxation and policy to support favored industries. Governments typically allocate resources inefficiently, which distorts fundamentals. If border-adjusted taxation becomes law in the U.S. we will look to get long volatility across commodity markets: Such legislation likely would rally the USD, which would lower global demand for commodities generally and lift supply by lowering local costs. This would run smack into higher U.S. inflation arising from the increasing cost of imported goods. This is a recipe for heightened uncertainty and price volatility. Russia lurks in the background: U.S. sanctions in the wake of alleged interference in American presidential elections, and Russia's response, will keep oil markets on edge. 2017 Weightings Energy: Overweight. The OPEC-Russia co-operation pact to limit production could evolve into a durable modus operandi for managing oil supply. Markets will judge the pact effective if tanker chartering out of the Persian Gulf falls, and global inventories draw by mid- to end-February. Base Metals: Neutral. Bulks and base metals prices will remain rangebound, until greater clarity on China's fiscal and monetary policy emerges. Fiscal stimulus in the U.S. will have a marginal effect on demand toward year-end. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold will remain sensitive to shifts in U.S. fiscal and monetary policy expectations. The possibility of border-adjusted taxes in the U.S. will hang like the proverbial Sword of Damocles over the gold market. Should it pass, the Fed could be forced to keep interest rates lower for longer to offset the massive tightening in financial conditions such a tax would impose. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We see limited downside for grains, despite record harvests. We favor wheat and rice over corn and beans. A stronger USD will be bearish for grain exports. Feature Commodities as an asset class remain attractive. However, constantly changing information flows affecting these markets compel us once again to favor tactical positioning over a broad strategic exposure to the asset class. Fundamentals - supply, demand, inventories - and financial variables remain in a state of flux. In the oil market, the durability of the OPEC-Russia co-operation pact to reduce oil production will be tested, following a year-end surge in global production. Markets will closely follow shipping activity - particularly out of the Persian Gulf - and global oil inventory levels for signs the production cuts engineered late last year by OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC producers, led by Russia, are taking hold. Uncertainty regarding the incoming Trump administration's tax and trade policies - and responses from states targeted by such policies (e.g., China and Mexico) - will keep decisions affecting supply and demand fluid. The incoming Trump administration's trade policies could alter global oil flows: e.g., a re-working of NAFTA that reduces U.S. refined-product exports to Latin America would result in lower demand for crude at American refineries, and present an opening to Chinese refiners. In addition, as mentioned above, legislation authorizing border-adjusted taxes favoring exports and penalizing imports likely will be taken up this year in the U.S. Congress. If we did see tax policy favouring U.S. exports over imports, we believe it would prompt a USD rally via reducing America's current account deficit. This would, all else equal, send commodity prices sharply lower, as EM commodity demand will contract, owing to higher USD prices for commodities, and production ex U.S. will increase, due to lower local costs. That said, border-adjusted taxation in the U.S. also would increase the price of imports, and lift realized and expected inflation. How this plays out is highly uncertain at present. A border-adjusted tax bill likely will be taken up in the current session. If it passes, it would have major implications for pricing relationships globally - chiefly WTI vs. Brent, and Brent vs. Dubai crudes, along with product differentials that drive shipping economics. If such a bill looks like it will pass, we expect a sharp increase in commodity-price volatility globally. If the odds do favor such a tax regime shift, we would look to get long WTI and short Brent further out the curve, expecting higher U.S. exports and lower imports. In addition, we would look to get long gold volatility - buying puts and calls - as policy uncertainty effects resolve themselves. Heightened Uncertainty Means Tactical Positioning Once Again Trumps Passive Commodities Allocation The primacy of tactical positioning was demonstrated in 2016 in the oil market, when strategic positions quickly became tactical, either because they were stopped out or reached their P&L targets quicker than expected. Supply destruction dominated price formation last year, following OPEC's decision to abandon its strategy to support prices via production management in November 2014. This destruction occurred mostly in non-Gulf OPEC, which was down 7.0% yoy in 2016 (Chart 2), and non-OPEC producers, particularly the U.S. shale-oil fields, where yoy production was down 12.0% by year-end 2016 (Chart 3). Chart 2Low Prices Crushed Non-Gulf Production... Chart 3...And U.S. Production Even in states where production increased - chiefly KSA and Russia (Chart 4) - domestic finances crumbled, leaving them in dire straits. By our estimates, between July 2014, just prior to its decision to launch OPEC's market-share war, and December 2016, KSA had burned through $220 billion of it foreign reserves, equivalent to 30% of its central-bank holdings. Russia had drawn down its official reserves by $77 billion over the same period, or 16% of its holdings; its burn rate was reduced by allowing its currency to depreciate, which lowered the local cost of producing oil and boosted profitability of exports priced in USD. This was the background that forced OPEC, led by KSA, and non-OPEC, led by Russia, to negotiate the year-end pact that resulted in an agreement to cut production by up to 1.8 mm b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 mm from OPEC, 300k b/d from Russia, and another 300 from other non-OPEC producers. The goal of this agreement is to reduce global oil inventories to more normal levels (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA, Russia Production Ramp ##br##Exacerbated Price Weakness Chart 5KSA-Russia Production Pact Aimed ##br##At Lowering Inventories Throughout 2016, as the supply-destruction drama was unfolding, numerous opportunities opened up to investors to fade market overshoots, brought about by over-reactions to fast-moving news flows. Unrestrained output by OPEC and non-OPEC producers strained oil-storage facilities early in the year, taking markets to the brink of breaking down entirely. Unexpected shifts in U.S. monetary policy - driven by random-walking data - also contributed to oil price volatility and opened numerous trading opportunities. Markets essentially ignored the cumulating right-tail price risks last year, following the supply destruction wrought by OPEC's declaration of a market-share war, and Russian overtures to OPEC seeking a production-allocation dialogue, which were very much in evidence in January 2016. The continual OPEC-Russia dialogue, which appeared to be bearing fruit in Doha before it was scuppered by KSA at the last minute in April, was the underlying geopolitical driver last year, and kept the odds of a production deal elevated. Based on our modeling, the supply surge following OPEC's decision made getting long contingent upside price exposure extremely compelling, particularly as it imperiled the finances of all oil producers - rich and poor, but mostly the poorer states like Venezuela and Nigeria. Our reasoning was lower prices would accelerate rebalancing of global markets and raise the odds of a major supply disruption at one of these failing states.2 Our modeling consistently indicated global oil markets would rebalance in 2016H2.3 Ultimately, this is how things played out, aided in no small measure by mid-year wildfires in Canada, which temporarily removed move than 1mm b/d from global markets, and sabotage of pipelines and loading facilities in Nigeria. Even with that, markets remained under pressure as Canadian barrels returned, and foreign reserves in KSA and Russia were rapidly depleted. These fundamentals, along with constantly changing Fed guidance, provided numerous opportunities to exploit recurring patterns thrown up by chance, as is evident in the returns on recommendations we made - averaging 95.1% last year - that naturally followed from our analysis (Table 1). Our favored exposure was getting long contingent exposure (i.e., options), using deferred call spreads in WTI and Brent, given our assessment the odds of higher prices exceeded the market's. Later in the year, following the OPEC-Russia pact, we got long a front-to-back crude oil spread (Dec/17 WTI vs. Dec/18 WTI) expecting the goal of the deal - reducing global inventories - stood a good chance of being realized. We got lucky putting the trade on as the market was correcting, but just ahead of the statement by KSA's oil minister that the Kingdom would do "whatever it takes" to make the deal work. This transformed a strategic position - one we expected to hold for months - into a one-week exposure that returned 493% (Table 1). Table 1Energy Trades Closed In 2016 In order to obtain a more detailed assessment of our energy portfolio's performance, we built an information ratio (IR) to evaluate how our energy recommendations performed compared to a selected benchmark, the S&P GS Commodity Index (GSCI). Essentially, our IR is used to assess whether an active portfolio has outperformed the selected benchmark in a consistent manner during the period of analysis, given the risk it incurred. To that end, our ratio looks at the average excess return of the active portfolio against the benchmark. This average excess return is then divided by its standard deviation (also referred to as the tracking error volatility) in order to get a risk-adjusted metric to evaluate whether the risk we took were compensated by the returns we generated. Our IR thus is calculated as: Formula The higher the IR, the better the risk-adjusted relative performance of the portfolio. Three elements can explain a high IR: high returns in the portfolio, low returns in the benchmark, or low tracking error volatility. Hence, this measure helps analyzing the notion of risk-reward tradeoff; it tells us whether or not the risk assumed in our trades was compensated by larger returns. In our case, to get the risk-adjusted returns of the energy portfolio, we selected the GSCI as a benchmark, as it is heavily skewed towards Energy commodities (around 60% of its composition). We believe this is a plausible benchmark alternative to our energy trade recommendations for an investor, whose choice is passive index exposure with a significant energy weighting. Our portfolio's average return in 2016 was 95%, while the GSCI return was 11%. The tracking error volatility was 56%.4 Using these inputs, we calculated the IR of our recommendations was 1.47. This is an excellent risk-adjusted return, and indicates the high volatility of our returns was more than compensated for by consistent positive excess returns our recommendations generated relative to passive GSCI exposure, which also can be used as a benchmark for energy-heavy commodity index exposure (i.e., "commodity beta"). Remain Overweight Oil We expect the combination of production cuts and natural declines will remove enough production from the market this year to restore global oil stocks to five-year average levels toward the end of 2017Q2 or early Q3 (Chart 5), even with cheating by OPEC and non-OPEC producers capable of increasing production. As a result, in 2017, we expect the OPEC-Russia deal to result in inventory draws of ~ 10% by 2017Q3. On the demand side, we continue to expect global growth of ~ 1.3 to 1.5mm b/d. Given these expectations, we expect U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl, up $5 from our 2016 forecast, on the back of the end-year OPEC-Russia pact. We are moving the bottom of the range in which we expect WTI prices to trade most of the time to $45/bbl and keeping the upside at $65/bbl. Markets already are pricing in a normalization of global inventories by year end (Chart 6 and Chart 7). We will look for opportunities to re-establish our long front-to-back positions, expecting the backwardation further out the curve will steepen. Chart 6Backwardation Steepening Near Term... Chart 7...And Further Out the Curve Further out the curve - i.e., mid-2018 and beyond - our conviction is lower: The massive capex cuts seen in the industry for projects expected between 2015 - 2020 will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers, chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia. It will be difficult to offset natural decline-curve losses - which will increase as U.S. shales account for a larger share of global supply - and meet increasing demand. As we've often noted, any indication U.S. shales or conventional supplies (Gulf states and Russian production) will not be able to move quickly enough to meet growing demand and replace natural declines could spike prices further out the curve. We expect U.S. oil exports to increase this year, which means the international benchmark, Brent crude oil, will increasingly price to move WTI into global markets. We expect U.S. WTI exports to increase from an average ~ 500k b/d, which should keep the price differential roughly around +$1.50/bbl differential (Brent over) for 2017. If we see border-adjusted taxation laws take effect, we would look to get long WTI vs. short Brent, and long U.S. products (e.g., U.S. Gulf gasoline and distillate exposure) vs. short Brent exposure. Remain Neutral Bulks, Base Metals Over in the bulks and base metals markets, a full-fledged iron-ore market-share war at the beginning of last year threatened to take prices to $30/ton. Then, seemingly out of the blue, an unexpected pivot by Chinese policymakers toward stimulating the "old economy" caught many bulks and base-metals traders and analysts - ourselves included - flat-footed. Powerful rallies in iron ore, steel and base metals early in the year on Chinese exchanges were dismissed as irrational exuberance on the part of retail investors. But, at the end of the day, these market participants were responsible for well-informed price signals that fully reflected low inventories and surging demand.5 The -0.5% average return in our bulks and base metals recommendations last year attests to how difficult we found these markets to read and anticipate (Table 2). Table 2Base Metals Trades Closed In 2016 As always, the evolution of China's economy will, as always, be critical to these markets, given that country's outsized role in iron ore, steel and base metals. We are broadly neutral the complex, and, with the exception of the nickel market, see supply and demand relatively balanced to slightly oversupplied globally and in China. Production globally and in China is growing yoy, while consumption shows signs of slowing. (Chart 8 and Chart 9). Chart 8World Base Metals Consumption Slowing,##br## Relative to Production... Chart 9...As Is ##br##China's Uncertainty re the direction of China's fiscal and monetary policy - chiefly, whether policymakers will, once again, resort to stimulating the "old economy" - will keep us broadly neutral bulks and base metals until we get further clarity on the direction of policy. We expect the monetary and fiscal stimulus that massively boosted China's housing market this year will wind down, bringing an end to the run-up in iron ore, steel and base metals prices. Odds favor "reflationary" policies to continue going into the Communist Party Congress next fall, but we do not expect anything along the lines of the surge in policy stimulus seen earlier this year: Unwinding and controlling property-market excesses and high debt levels will limit policymakers' desire to turbo-charge the housing market again, limiting the boost such policies provide. The fate of border-adjusted taxation in the U.S. Congress is critically important to bulk and base-metals markets, since it would encourage exports and discourage imports (along with raising their prices). Tax policy favouring U.S. exports over imports likely would prompt a USD rally, which would send commodity prices generally sharply lower. It would boost U.S. steel production and base metals exports, while raising the cost of imports. A border-adjusted tax bill likely will be taken up in the current session of Congress. We are downgrading our tactically bullish view on iron ore to neutral. Strategically, we retain a bearish bias, as rising iron ore supply may overwhelm the market again in 2017H2. We remain tactically neutral and strategically bearish steel. Low steel inventories and production disruptions caused by China's recently launched environmental inspection program likely will continue to support steel prices in the near term. However, persistently high steel output and falling demand from the Chinese property sector will eventually knock down prices in 2017H2. Manufacturing will play a larger role in copper markets, and will drive the demand side this year. However, if we see a stronger USD - either as a result of Fed policy or U.S. fiscal policy - price appreciation will be limited. We remain neutral copper, expecting a concerted effort to slow the housing boom in China. Reflationary policies will still support real demand for copper, but will reduce demand from new construction. The supply deficit in nickel will widen on the back of rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply in 2017, which will support prices. We expect nickel will outperform zinc over a one-year time horizon. For zinc, we remain tactically neutral and strategically bearish. We expect zinc supply to rise considerably in response to current high prices. Aluminum supply - for the moment - will lag demand globally, which keeps us tactically bullish and strategically neutral. Supply shortages will likely persist ex-China over the next three to six months. Stay Neutral Precious Metals Precious metals, gold in particular, staged an impressive rally on the back of unexpected easing by the U.S. Fed in response to weaker-than-expected sub-1% GDP growth in 1Q16 GDP. Markets had been pricing in as many as four interest-rate hikes earlier in the year into short-term expectations, which were quickly dashed. Markets lowered their expectations for multiple rate hikes last year, which weakened the USD and U.S. real rates, setting the stage for the gold rally. Nonetheless, gold proved a difficult commodity to trade last year, as our results indicate - the average return on our precious metals recommendations amounted to a paltry -0.65% (Table 3). For the near term - i.e., until greater clarity on Fed policy and the incoming Trump administration's fiscal policy direction becomes clear - we remain neutral precious metals, and will avoid taking any further exposure other than perhaps getting long gold volatility - i.e., buying puts and calls in the gold market - if the odds of border-adjusted taxation legislation passing increase. Such legislation likely would rally the USD, which would lower global demand and increase supply ex U.S. at the margin for commodities generally, oil and base metals in particular. This would be deflationary, given the high correlations between oil and base metals consumption and U.S. inflation (Chart 10).6 However, such a taxation scheme also would raise U.S. inflation by increasing the cost of imported goods, sending the U.S. core PCE, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, higher. The global disinflationary impulse from a stronger USD would run headlong into higher U.S. inflation, which would be a recipe for heightened uncertainty and price volatility. Table 3Precious Metals Trades ##br##Closed In 2016 Chart 10Risk of Deflation Will Rise If Border-Adjusted ##br##Taxes Prove Deflationary This will complicate U.S. monetary policy. We believe the Fed also will be waiting on such direction, and that interest-rate policy will, therefore, remain pretty much be on hold, keeping precious metals - gold, in particular - rangebound. For the moment, the possibility of border-adjusted taxes in the U.S. will hang like the proverbial Sword of Damocles over the gold market. We are taking profits on the tactical long gold position we opened December 15, 2016, as of today's close. Remain Underweight AGS Lastly, Ag markets provided us no joy, as the El Nino wreaked havoc on our recommendations. Our average -1.0% return for the year amply demonstrates the difficulty of trading markets so heavily influenced by weather (Table 4). Going into 2017, we believe there is a limited downside for grains. The downtrend since August 2012 like forms a bottom this year, if, as we are modeling, we see a return to normal weather conditions. That said, the principal upside risk remains unfavorable weather in major grain-producing countries, which could send badly battered grain prices surging as they did in 2016H1. Among grains, we favor wheat and rice over corn and soybeans. Global soybean acreage is likely to expand as the crop provides higher returns than other grains. South American corn output will continue rising on favorable policies and weak currencies, adding further pressure to already-high U.S. corn inventories, in particular, and global inventories globally (Chart 11). Table 4AGS Trades Closed In 2016 Chart 11Global Grain Inventories Remain High Softs - cotton and sugar - likely will underperform grains in 2017, reversing their outperformance this year. We are tactically bearish cotton, as U.S. cotton acreage is likely to increase next spring. Strategically, we are neutral cotton. For the global sugar market, barring extremely unfavorable weather, we are tactically and strategically bearish. This year's extreme rally in prices may result in a small supply surplus in 2017. Our Ag strategies will continue to focus on relative-value investments. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodities & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Belanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Tactics Cliff Notes; A Synopsis of MCDP 1-3 Tactics," published by the United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. 10 May 1998 (pp. 2, 3. sf). 2 In our January 7, 2016, publication we noted investors were ignoring growing upside price risk and suggested they get long a Dec/16 $50/$55 WTI call spread to gain exposure to higher volatility. We also recommended remaining long Dec/16 and Dec/17 WTI vs. Brent following passage of legislation to allow U.S. crude exports. We ultimately took profits on these recommendations of 172% on the call spread in June, and 97% on the Dec/16 WTI vs. Brent spread in June, and 88% on the Dec/17 WTI vs. Brent spread in July, respectively (Table 1). Please see "Oil Market Ignores Right-Tail Saudi Risks" in the January 7, 2016, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, which is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 In our January 21, 2016, Commodity & Energy Strategy article entitled "Global Oil Sell-off Will Accelerate Rebalancing," we noted, "We expect oil markets to rebalance by late 2016Q3 or early Q4. We remain long Dec/16 $50 calls vs. $55 calls, in anticipation of rebalancing and as a hedge against geopolitical risk." 4 Note: In order to find the standard deviation of the portfolio's excess returns (tracking error volatility), we averaged the daily percentage change in each trade's underlying assets. Any given trade only weighed in the daily average return if it was open during that day of the year. We are not accounting for the type of trades (spreads, pairs or single trades), we only track the underlying asset returns. From these daily average returns we subtracted the daily return of the preferred benchmark to obtain the daily excess return. Using this, we computed an historical standard deviation (based on 20-day periods) for every day during which a trade was open in our portfolio (we had 203 days with at least one energy trade opened). Lastly, we annualized this standard deviation to obtain our tracking error volatility. 5 Please see "Dead-Cat Bounces Notwithstanding, Iron Ore Will Trade Lower" in the January 21, 2016 issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and "Fade The Copper Rally" in the February 25, 2016 issue. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 In earlier research, we've shown U.S. core PCE inflation is highly correlated with EM oil and base metals demand. Please see "2017 Commodity Outlook: Precious Metals" published December 15, 2016. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of December 30, 2016. The model has boosted its overweight in the Euro Area, especially in Italy, Spain and Netherland, financed mainly by a slight reduction in the large overweight in the U.S. Japan's underweight is back to the largest again, followed by the U.K. (Table 1). Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the non-U.S. model (Level 2) outperformed its benchmark by 206 bps in December, thanks to the overweight in Euro Area. The large overweight in the U.S. caused the Level 1 model to underperform by 27 bps. Overall, the GAA model outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 15 bps in December. Since Inception, the GAA model outperformed its benchmark by 26 bps. Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of December 30, 2016. Table 3AllocationsTable 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The momentum component has shifted Info Tech from overweight to underweight. The valuation component indicated that Consumer Staples is no longer expensive. For mode details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Senior Analyst patrick@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
The Tactical Asset Allocation model can provide investment recommendations which diverge from those outlined in our regular weekly publications. The model has a much shorter investment horizon - namely, one month - and thus attempts to capture very tactical opportunities. Meanwhile, our regular recommendations have a longer expected life, anywhere from 3-months to a year (or longer). This difference explains why the recommendations between the two publications can deviate from each other from time to time. Highlights In December, the model underperformed global equities and the S&P in USD and local-currency terms. For January, the model increased its allocation to stocks and reduced its allocation to bonds (Chart 1). Within the equity portfolio, the weighting to euro area stocks was increased. The model boosted its allocation to Canadian and Swedish bonds at the expense of other European markets. The risk index for stocks deteriorated in December, as did the bond risk index. Feature Performance In December, the recommended balanced portfolio gained 2.1% in local-currency terms and 0.8% in U.S. dollar terms (Chart 2). This compares with a gain of 2.9% for the global equity benchmark and a 3.4% gain for the S&P 500 index. Given that the underlying model is structured in local-currency terms, we generally recommend that investors hedge their positions, though we provide other suggestions on currency risk exposure from time to time. The continued bonds selloff was a drag on the model's performance in December. Chart 1Model Weights Chart 2Portfolio Total Returns Weights The model increased its allocation to stocks from 53% to 57%, and trimmed its bond weighting from 47% to 43% (Table 1). The model boosted its equity allocation to Spain by 3 points, Germany by 2 points, Italy by 1 point, Japan by 1 point and France by 1 point. Meanwhile, weightings were reduced in Sweden by 3 points and New Zealand by 1 point. In the fixed-income space, the allocation to Canadian paper was boosted by 5 points, Sweden by 3 points, New Zealand by 2 points. The allocation to Italian bonds was reduced by 6 points, France by 4 points, U.K. by 3 points, and U.S. Treasurys by 1 point. Table 1Model Weights (As Of December 22, 2016) Currency Allocation Local currency-based indicators drive the construction of our model. As such, the performance of the model's portfolio should be compared with the local-currency global equity benchmark. The decision to hedge currency exposure should be made at the client's discretion, though from time to time, we do provide our recommendations. The dollar's attempt at consolidating its gains was cut short by the hawkish Fed. As a result, our Dollar Capitulation Index is back to levels that indicate the rally in the broad trade-weighted dollar could pause. However, unless the new administration pours cold water on expectations of a major fiscal boost, monetary policy divergence will underpin the dollar bull market (Chart 3). Chart 3U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* And Capitulation Capital Market Indicators The risk index for commodities improved slightly reflecting a better reading from the momentum indicator. However, this asset class remains excluded from the portfolio (Chart 4). The risk index for global equities remains at the highest level in over two years. Despite this, our model slightly increased its allocation in equities following four consecutive months of reductions (Chart 5). Chart 4Commodity Index And Risk Chart 5Global Stock Market And Risk The deterioration in the value and liquidity indicators for U.S. stocks was offset by some improvement in the momentum reading. As a result, the risk index for U.S. stocks was flat in December (Chart 6). The risk index for euro area equities increased in December and is now at neutral levels. However, even after the latest increase, the risk index for euro area stocks is noticeably lower than the U.S. measure (Chart 7). Positive growth momentum and a weaker currency could provide support for the euro area equities. Chart 6U.S. Stock Market And Risk Chart 7Euro Area Stock Market And Risk The model slightly increased its allocation to German equities despite the deterioration in the risk index (Chart 8). Unlike most of the equity risk indexes in the model's universe, the one for Emerging Asian stocks improved in December. The model kept its allocation to this asset unchanged (Chart 9). Chart 8German Stock Market And Risk Chart 9Emerging Asian Stock Market And Risk The risk index for bonds deteriorated in December, but remains at a historically low-risk level reflecting oversold readings from the momentum indicator. The model has trimmed its allocation to bonds a touch (Chart 10). The risk index for U.S. Treasurys was little changed in December. Despite its very low risk reading, the model is adding allocation to bond markets that feature more oversold conditions. (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Bond Yields And Risk Chart 11U.S. Bond Yields And Risk Canadian bonds remain massively oversold based on our momentum measure, and the overall risk index is at extremely low-risk levels. The model boosted its allocation to this asset (Chart 12). With oversold conditions unwinding and the cyclical indicator moving in a more bond-negative direction, the overall risk index for Italian bonds has shifted back to neutral levels. The model has excluded this asset class from its allocation (Chart 13). Chart 12Canadian Bond Yields And Risk Chart 13Italian Bond Yields and Risk U.K. bonds remain deeply in low-risk territory, despite a small deterioration in its risk index. The oversold reading in the momentum measure is completely overshadowing the negative signal from the cyclical indicator. Allocation to gilts remains one of the highest in the bond universe, even after the model trimmed its exposure to this market (Chart 14). The risk index for Swedish bonds fell once again in December reflecting improved readings in all of its components. Extremely oversold conditions dominate the overall risk index and suggest that a pullback in yields is overdue. The model boosted its allocation to Swedish paper. (Chart 15). Chart 14U.K. Bond Yields And Risk Chart 15Swedish Bond Yields And Risk Currency Technicals The 13-week momentum measure indicates that the dollar's ascent could face near-term resistance. However, the continued recovery in the 40-week rate of change measure suggests that the dollar bull market has more upside. The latest round of central bank meetings reinforces the monetary divergence between the Fed on one side, and the ECB and BoJ on the other (Chart 16). With the prospect of the Bank of Canada staying put, while its southern peer gradually raises rates, the rate differential should exert downward pressure on the CAD/USD. Technically, the breakdown of the longer-term rate-of-change measure is pointing in that direction. In addition, the short-term rate of change metric is not stretched. However, the risk to this view is that the headwinds for the loonie arising from monetary policy divergences can be mitigated by higher oil prices (Chart 17). With the BoJ pegging nominal JGB yields, the differential in real rates is supportive of a stronger USD/JPY. This cyclical outlook for the yen is being confirmed by the 40-week rate of change measure. That said, the 13-week momentum measure is at levels that have signaled a pause in the yen weakening trend in both 2013 and 2015 (Chart 18). Chart 16U.S. Trade-Weighted Dollar* Chart 17Canadian Dollar Chart 18Yen Miroslav Aradski, Senior Analyst miroslava@bcaresearch.com
Dear Client, This is our last report of the year. We will be back the first week of January with our 2017 Strategy Outlook. On behalf of BCA's Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to take this moment to wish you and your loved ones a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and all the best for the coming year. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights The global economy has entered a reflationary window, where deflation risks are receding, but fears of excess inflation have yet to surface. Europe and Japan, two regions where central banks are in no hurry to raise rates and whose stock markets tend to have a cyclical tilt, are the most likely to benefit. Emerging markets should also gain from a more reflationary environment. However, a rising dollar and elevated debt levels will take the bloom off the rose. Chronically low productivity and labor force growth will make it difficult for central banks to contain inflation once it does begin to accelerate. Global bond yields will rise only modestly next year, but could begin to surge as the decade wears on. Feature Stagflation Is Coming, But Not Yet Bill Gates once noted that "We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten." This observation applies just as well to the risk of stagflation as it does to technology. For the next few years, the likelihood of a disorderly rise in inflation is extremely low. Beyond then, however, the risk is that inflation surprises to the upside, perhaps significantly so. Three factors will prevent global inflation from rising too rapidly over the next two-to-three years: The global economy still suffers from a fair amount of spare capacity; While spare capacity is likely to decline further, it will do so only gradually; Even when all remaining spare capacity is exhausted, the knock-on effect to inflation will initially be quite small. Spare Capacity Lingers Chart 1 shows that the global output gap has declined from its high in 2009, but is still larger than it has been at any time since the early 1990s. This can be seen in low industrial capacity utilization rates in some countries (Chart 2), as well as in the high levels of joblessness and involuntary part-time employment (Charts 3 and 4). Chart 1Mind The (Output) Gap Chart 2Global Capacity Utilization Remains Low Chart 3AJoblessness Still Elevated In Europe Chart 3BJoblessness Still Elevated In Europe Chart 4AHigher Incidence Of Involuntary ##br##Part-Time Employment Chart 4BHigher Incidence Of Involuntary ##br##Part-Time Employment Granted, the U.S. is much closer to full employment than most other economies. However, high levels of spare capacity abroad will still exert downward pressure on U.S. inflation. The reason for this was first laid out by Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming in the early 1970s. The Mundell-Fleming model, as it is now called, posits that a country's interest rate will rise in response to stronger growth, thereby pushing up the value of its currency. Indeed, Mundell and Fleming showed that easier fiscal policy would not benefit a small open economy at all in a world of perfect capital mobility and flexible exchange rates because any gains from the stimulus would be entirely offset by a deterioration in the trade balance. Chart 5Real Rate Differentials ##br##Are Driving Up The Dollar While the Mundell-Fleming model is a gross oversimplification of how the global economy actually functions, it is still highly relevant for understanding today's macro environment. The real broad trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 21% since mid-2014, largely due to the widening of interest rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 5). We estimate that the stronger dollar has reduced the level of U.S. real GDP by 1% so far, and will reduce it by another 0.5% stemming from the lagged effects from the recent dollar rally. The buoyant greenback will keep a lid on U.S. inflation both directly, in the form of lower import prices and indirectly, in the form of slower employment growth. The analysis above leads to three important investment implications. First, it implies that the dollar will remain well bid as long as the Fed remains the only major central bank in hiking mode. We have been long the DXY since October 2014 - a trade that has gained 18.6%. We think there is another 5% of upside from current levels. Second, a stronger dollar will help redistribute growth to Europe and Japan, two economies that desperately need it. We are bullish on European and Japanese stocks and bearish on the euro and the yen. Third, Treasury yields will be hard-pressed to rise substantially from current levels until spare capacity outside the U.S. is extinguished. Only once other central banks start raising rates will the Fed be able to hike rates in a sustainable manner. Until then, any Fed tightening beyond what the market is currently expecting will put upward pressure on the dollar, reducing the need for further hikes. A Gradual Recovery Table 1Global Growth Will Improve Next Year Global growth should pick up next year in line with the IMF's most recent projections (Table 1). Alongside stronger growth in Japan and continued above-trend growth in Europe, the U.S. economy will benefit from robust consumer spending on the back of rising real wages. In addition, residential investment should rise, as foreshadowed by the jump in homebuilder confidence in December. Tighter credit spreads, deregulation, and a modest recovery in energy sector investment should also boost business capex. Despite this welcome reflationary backdrop, a number of factors will hold back growth. Most prominently, debt levels are still high around the world (Chart 6). In fact, emerging market debt continues to rise more quickly than GDP. Even in the optimistic scenario where the ratio of EM debt-to-GDP merely stabilizes, this would still entail a negative credit impulse (Chart 7). Chart 6Global Debt Levels Are Still High Chart 7Negative EM Credit Impulse Looming Meanwhile, monetary policy continues to be constrained by the zero bound in a number of developed economies. Many EM central banks will also be reluctant to cut interest rates due to fears that this could precipitate a disorderly plunge in their currencies. And while fiscal policy around the world will no longer be restrictive, a major burst of government stimulus is not in the cards. Donald Trump's fiscal package may not boost aggregate demand by as much as the more optimistic estimates suggest. As we have noted before, most of America's infrastructure needs consist of basic maintenance. There simply are not enough marquee "shovel-ready" projects around that can make use of the public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions. There is also a significant risk that Congressional Republicans will try to sneak through cuts to Social Security and Medicare, much to the annoyance of many of Trump's voters. As for Trump's proposed personal tax cuts, while they are hefty in size, their bang for the buck is likely to be modest, given that the benefits are tilted towards higher income groups that tend to save much of their earnings. Indeed, it is possible that cutting the estate tax would actually depress spending by reducing the incentive for older households to blow through their wealth before the Grim Reaper (and The Taxman) arrive. Likewise, corporate tax cuts will have only an incremental effect on business capex, given that companies are already flush with cash and effective tax rates are well below statutory levels. The bottom line is that global growth is likely to rise in 2017, but not by enough to cause inflation to surge. A Flat Phillips Curve ... For Now Chart 8The Phillips Curve Has Flattened It might take a few more years for most of the developed world to claw its way back to something approximating full employment, but with any luck, it will get there. What happens to inflation then? The answer is probably not much. The relationship between economic slack and inflation is encapsulated by the so-called Phillips curve. As one would intuitively expect, inflation tends to rise when slack diminishes. However, this correlation has weakened over the past few decades (Chart 8). For example, U.S. core inflation declined only modestly during the Great Recession, and has been slow to bounce back, even as the output gap has shrunk. Economists have proposed a variety of reasons for why the Phillips curve may have flattened out over time. Globalization is often cited as one factor, but the empirical evidence for this view is rather shaky.1 True, free trade and capital mobility have helped keep inflation in check by diverting excess domestic demand into higher net imports via the Mundell-Fleming channel discussed above. However, this only implies that globalization may prevent economies from sliding too far along the Phillips curve. It says nothing about the slope of the curve itself. A fall in unionization rates and a decline in the use of inflation-indexed wage contracts are also often cited as reasons for why the correlation between inflation and economic slack has diminished. Here again, the evidence is rather mixed. While the U.S. has experienced a pronounced decline in unionization rates, Canada has not (Chart 9). Nevertheless, the sensitivity of inflation to economic fluctuations has fallen in both countries by roughly the same magnitude. Likewise, the increased use of inflation-index contracts in the 1970s appears mainly to have been a response to rising inflation, rather than a cause of it (Chart 10). The one point on which most economists agree is that long-term inflation expectations are much more stable now than they used to be, which has reduced the volatility of actual inflation. Central banks deserve some of the credit for this. The adoption of inflation targeting, coupled with more transparent communication policies, has helped anchor inflation expectations. A more sober assessment of economic conditions has also been a plus. Back in the 1970s, the Fed continuously overstated the degree of economic slack (Chart 11). This led it to keep interest rates too low for too long, thereby sowing the seeds for much higher inflation later on. Chart 9Inflation Fell In Canada, ##br##Despite A High Unionization Rate Chart 10When High Inflation ##br##Entailed Inflation-Indexed Contracts Chart 11The Fed Continuously Overstated ##br##The Magnitude Of Economic Slack Shifting Sands For Inflation The Fed has vowed not to make the same mistake again, but the temptation to exploit the flatness of the Phillips curve may be too great to resist. A flattish Phillips curve implies a low "sacrifice ratio." This means that the Fed could let the economy overheat without putting undue upward pressure on inflation. While the Fed would have reservations about pursuing such a strategy, Janet Yellen's musings about running a "high-pressure economy" suggest that it is at least willing to entertain the idea. The 25-year period of falling inflation that began in the early 1980s had a dark side. As Hyman Minsky first noted, economic stability can beget instability: The so-called "Great Moderation" that policymakers were patting themselves on the back for before the financial crisis created a fertile milieu for rising debt levels. Excessively high debt levels are deflationary at the outset because they limit the ability of overstretched borrowers to spend. However, high debt levels also reduce investment in new capacity - homes, office buildings, machinery, etc. This undermines the supply-side of the economy. Once the output gap is closed, high debt levels can become inflationary by increasing the incentive for central banks to keep rates low in order to suppress interest-servicing costs and reduce real debt burdens. The challenges posed by the zero-bound constraint could also justify efforts to raise inflation targets. After all, if inflation were higher, this would give central banks the ability to push down real rates further into negative territory in the event of an economic downturn. Such a step is unlikely to be taken anytime soon. That said, given that a number of well-regarded economists - including prominent policymakers such as Olivier Blanchard, the former chief economist at the IMF, San Francisco Fed President John Williams, and former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota - have floated the idea of raising the inflation target, long-term investors should be open-minded about the possibility. In any event, as we discussed in great detail last week, underlying economic trends - ranging from the retreat from globalization to the slowdown in potential GDP growth - are all pushing the global economy in a more inflationary direction.2 This suggests that inflation could move appreciably higher towards the end of this decade. Investment Conclusions Chart 12Near-Term Inflation Risk Is Low Inflation is unlikely to rise significantly over the next few years. Indeed, the sharp appreciation in the dollar since the election will put downward pressure on U.S. inflation in the coming months. This view is supported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Price Pressure gauge, which shows that there is less than an 8% chance that inflation will rise above 2.5% over the next 12 months (Chart 12). And even when the economy has reached full employment and the effects of a stronger dollar have washed through the system, inflation will be slow to increase. Consider how inflation evolved during the 1960s. As my colleague Mathieu Savary has pointed out, U.S. inflation did not reach 4% until mid-1968. By that time, the output gap had been positive for five years, hitting a whopping 6% of GDP in 1966 on the back of rising military expenditures on the Vietnam War and social spending on Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs (Chart 13).3 The lesson is that it often takes a number of years for an overheated economy to generate meaningful inflation. This suggests that the global economy is entering a "goldilocks" reflationary window, where deflation risks are receding, but fears of excess inflation have yet to surface. This is obviously good news for global risk assets, and underpins our cyclically constructive view on global equities. Europe and Japan, two regions where central banks are in no hurry to raise rates and whose stock markets tend to have a cyclical tilt, are the most likely to benefit. In fact, both economies have seen a decline in real yields since the U.S. elections, as rising inflation expectations have outpaced the increase in nominal yields (Chart 14). Emerging markets should also gain from a more reflationary environment, but a rising dollar and elevated debt levels will take the bloom off the rose. Chart 13It Can Take A While For Inflation ##br##To Rise In Response To An Overheated Economy Chart 14Europe And Japan: Rising Inflation ##br##Expectations Suppressing Real Yields While we have a positive cyclical (3-to-24 month) view on risk assets, we have significant concerns about both the near-term and longer-term outlooks. From a short-term tactical perspective, developed market equities - especially U.S. equities - are highly vulnerable to a correction. This is reflected in our sentiment indices, which have moved firmly into overbought territory (Chart 15). It can also be seen in the weak historic performance of global stocks following sharp spikes in bond yields (Table 2). Chart 15U.S. Equity Sentiment Is Stretched Table 2Stocks Tend To Suffer When Bond Yields Spike Over a longer-term horizon, the risks to global equities are also to the downside. Once inflation is on a firm upward trajectory, central banks may find it more difficult to arrest the trend. Against the backdrop of weak productivity and labor force growth, memories of stagflation may reappear. As Chart 16 shows, stagflation in the 1970s was devastating for equities, and this time may not be any different. The bottom line is that investors should lease the bull market in stocks, rather than own it. Chart 16Stagflation Was Devastating For Stocks From The Vault: Two "Big Picture" Holiday Reports Lastly, for those who would like to take their minds off the nitty-gritty of the financial world for the next two weeks and focus more on transcendent issues, let me recommend two special reports. The first, entitled A Smarter World is based on a speech I delivered at the 2014 BCA New York Investment Conference. I argue that genetic changes in the human population sowed the seeds for the Industrial Revolution. This development then unleashed a virtuous cycle where rising living standards led to better health and educational outcomes, generating even further gains in living standards. Many countries now appear to be at the end of this cycle, but new technologies could one day generate huge gains in IQs, sending humanity down a path towards immortality. Of course, before we get there, we have to contend with all sorts of existential pitfalls. With that in mind, the second report, Doomsday Risk, examines what is literally a life-and-death issue: the likelihood of human extinction. Drawing on insights from biology, history, cosmology, and probability theory, our analysis yields a number of surprising investment implications. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Eddie Gerba and Corrado Macchiarelli, "Is Globalization Reducing The Ability Of Central Banks To Control Inflation?" European Parliament, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Brussels, Belgium (2015); Jane Ihrig, Steven B. Kamin, Deborah Lindner, and Jaime Marquez, "Some Simple Tests Of The Globalization And Inflation Hypothesis," International Finance Vol. 13, no. 3 (2010): pp. 343-375; and Laurence M. Ball, "Has Globalization Changed Inflation?" NBER Working Paper No. 12687 (2006). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Main Street Bonds, Wall Street Stocks," dated December 16, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits," dated December 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Dear Client, We are pleased to present our 2017 Outlook for Grains & Softs, covering corn, wheat, soybeans and rice in the grain markets, and cotton and sugar. This is our last regular Weekly Report for the year. You should have received BCA's annual "Mr. X" interview on December 20, and we trust you found it stimulating and insightful. We will resume regular publishing on January 5th with our annual Review and Outlook summarizing the performance of our market recommendations for 2016, with an eye on where we see value going into the New Year. As a preview, the average return on our recommendations this year was 33.1%, led by our Energy recommendations, which were up an average 95.1% in 2016. Please see page 15 of this week's report for a summary. The Commodity & Energy Strategy team wishes you and yours a wonderful holiday season and a prosperous New Year. Turning to the Ags, we believe there is a limited downside for grain prices in 2017. The downtrend since August 2012 may form a bottom next year under the assumption of normal weather conditions. However, the principal upside risk remains unfavorable weather in major grain-producing countries, which could send badly battered grain prices surging as they did in 2016H1. Among grains, we favor wheat and rice over corn and soybeans. Global soybean acreage is likely to expand as the crop provides higher returns than other grains. South American corn output will continue rising on favorable policies and weak currencies, adding further pressure to already-high U.S. corn inventories. Softs - cotton and sugar - likely will underperform grains in 2017, reversing their outperformance this year. We are tactically bearish cotton, as U.S. cotton acreage is likely to increase next spring. Strategically, we are neutral cotton. For the global sugar market, barring extremely unfavorable weather, we are tactically and strategically bearish. This year's extreme rally in prices may result in a small supply surplus in 2017. Our Ag strategies will continue to focus on relative-value investments. We have three investment strategies: We look to go long wheat versus cotton, long corn versus sugar, and long rice versus soybeans. Kindest regards, Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Chart 1Ag In 2017: A Reversal Of Grain ##br##Underperformance? Feature Limited Downside For Grains; Softs ... Not So Much As of December 20, the CCI grain index had declined 0.3% since the beginning of this year. In comparison, sugar and cotton prices rallied 19.8% and 9.6% during the same period of time, respectively. For individual grains, soybean prices were up 15.4%, while corn, wheat and rice declined 2.4%, 14.2% and 18.2%, respectively. Cotton and sugar outperformed grains considerably this year (Chart 1, panel 1). Among grains, soybeans had the best run, while wheat and rice had the worst (Chart 1, panel 2). Going forward, the question is: Will these trends continue into 2017, or is a reversal likely to occur? For now, we cannot rule out the possibility of a continuation of these trends, but a reversal is possible, depending on weather conditions. We will tread water carefully and re-evaluate our calls next April when U.S. farmers' planting decisions are made, and the outlook for the South American soybean and sugar harvests become clearer. Grains In 2017: Likely Bottoming With Potential Upside We believe there is limited downside for grain prices in 2017. Four consecutive years of supply surpluses have driven grain prices down by more than 50% since August 2012, when grain prices reached all-time highs (Chart 2, panels 1 and 2). In the meantime, global grain inventories also rose to their highest levels since 2002 (Chart 2, panel 3). True, it is difficult to get bullish on such elevated inventories. Another year of supply surpluses obviously would send prices lower. Will that happen? No doubt, it could. But we believe the odds are fairly low. A Dissection Of This Year's Supply Increase Global grain output grew 5.2% this year, the second highest rate of growth since 2005. Yield growth, mainly due to extremely favorable weather, contributed 87% of the supply increase, while acreage expansion accounted for the rest (Chart 3, panels 1 and 2). Chart 2Grain: Too Much Supply In 2016... Chart 3...Less Supply in 2017? Now, with yields of corn, soybeans and wheat all at record highs, and rice yields near their record highs, grain yields are more likely to have a pullback than a continuation of growth in 2017. If global grain yields revert to their trend line as the third panel of Chart 3 suggests, global grain yields will decline 1.4% in 2017. This year, the world aggregate harvested grain acreage only grew 0.7%. Currently low grain prices are discouraging grain plantings, while new supportive policies in Argentina and a strengthening dollar are likely to encourage grain sowing in the southern hemisphere. Taking all related factors into account, we expect a 0.2 - 0.5% expansion in global grain acreage next year. Based on our analysis, we believe world grain output is likely to decline about 1% next year, assuming normal weather conditions. On the other side of the ledger, global grain demand has been growing steadily over the past 30 years (Chart 3, panel 4). Last year demand grew 3.4%. In 2017, low prices likely will boost consumption. Therefore, we expect similar growth in global grain demand next year. In the current crop year, the global grain market has a supply surplus of 55 million metric tons (mmt). Based on our calculations, given the assumptions we've outlined above, a 1% decline in global grain output coupled with 3.4% growth in global grain demand will swing the grain market into a supply deficit of 58 mmt. If we assume a more conservative scenario in which global grain output does not decline at all, a 2.2% rate of growth in global consumption still will send the global grain market into a supply deficit. The odds of seeing this scenario unfold are relatively high, given that the average growth in global grain consumption was 2.5% over the past 10 years, and 2.9% over the past four years, when grain prices were mired in a downtrend. We believe this would clearly be positive to global grain prices. Considering the elevated global grain inventories and the expected supply deficit we foresee, we believe, even if prices do not move to the upside, the downside for grain prices should be at least limited in 2017 as inventories are drawn down. In addition to the supply deficit, rising oil prices are supportive to grain prices as well. All else equal, higher oil prices will increase the production cost of grains. Bottom Line: We expect limited downside for grain prices next year. The 2017 Outlook For Individual Grains Corn, soybeans, wheat and rice prices are highly correlated with each other (Chart 4, panel 1). In terms of end consumption, they can all be consumed as either human food or animal feed. In terms of supply, farmers rotate among these crops depending on their profit outlook, soil conditions, and government policies. In 2017, we believe wheat and rice likely will outperform corn and soybeans, for two reasons: Crop-rotation economics and inventories. Chart 4Wheat & Rice May Outperform ##br##Corn & Soybeans In 2017 Firstly, global acreage rotation still favors soybeans most, then corn, over wheat and rice. If we rebase grain prices back to the beginning of 2006, corn and soybean prices are currently 62% and 67% higher than they were at the start of this interval. In comparison, wheat and rice prices are only 19% and 16% higher, respectively (Chart 4, panel 1). The U.S. is the world's biggest corn exporter, the second-largest soybean and wheat exporter. Informa Economics, a private consulting firm, projects 2017 soybean plantings will rise 6.2% to 88.862 million acres, while corn and winter wheat plantings will fall 4.6% and 8.1% to 90.151 million acres and 33.213 million acres, respectively. If these projections are realized, the 2017 U.S. winter wheat planted acreage will be the lowest since 1911. Winter wheat accounts for about 70% of U.S. total wheat production. Secondly, wheat and rice inventories ex-China declined, while corn and soybean inventories ex-China increased. Yes, it is true that the world wheat and rice stocks-to-use ratios rose to the highest since 2002 and 2003, respectively. (Chart 4, panel 2). But this does not show the full picture for these markets: 58% of global rice inventories and 44% of global wheat inventories are in China, even though that country accounts for only 12% of global rice imports and 2% of global wheat imports. China is unlikely to export these inventories to the world: the country tends to hold massive grain inventories, in order to prevent domestic food crises. This means that global wheat and rice importers outside China, which account for about 88% of the global rice trade and 98% of the global wheat trade, will compete for inventories outside China. The third panel of Chart 4 shows the rice stocks-to-use ratio for the ex-China world has already dropped to its lowest level since 2008, while the wheat stocks-to-use ratio ex-China already has declined for two years in a row. This is positive for wheat and rice prices. In comparison, the soybean and corn stocks-to-use ratios ex-China looks much less promising. Both ratios are at or near record highs (Chart 4, panel 3). China only accounts for 2% of the global corn trade, therefore corn importers outside China will have more abundant supplies available to them in 2017. China is the largest buyer of soybeans, accounting for 63% of the global soybean trade. The country will have more bargaining power, on the back of increasing competition among major soybean exporters (the U.S., Brazil and Argentina). In the meantime, China's central policy is currently focused on encouraging domestic soybean plantings mainly at the cost of corn, which is negative for global soybean prices and good for global corn prices. In 2016, the corn acreage in China fell for the first time since 2004 while its soybean acreage jumped 9.1% - the largest increase since 2001 (Chart 4, panel 4). Chart 5Downside Risks To Grains Downside Risks To Our Grain View Grain prices could decline more than 10% from current levels next year, if favorable weather results in a slight drop (less than 1.4%) or even an increase in global grain yields. Also, if grain prices rise significantly in 2017H1 - for whatever reason - this likely would spur plantings and depress prices. If either of these events transpire, we will re-evaluate our grain view. A strengthening dollar is also a major risk to our view. BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy expects a further 5%-7% appreciation in U.S. dollar in 2017. We believe most of the negative effects of a strengthening dollar already are reflected in depressed grain prices, as the U.S. dollar has already appreciated 36% since July 2011. At the end of last week, the U.S. dollar was only 2% lower than all-time highs reached in February 2002 (Chart 5, panel 1). Another risk to watch is acreage expansion in Argentina, Brazil and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) region. All of these countries/regions had massive currency depreciations and supportive agricultural policies this year, especially in Argentina (Chart 5, panels 2, 3 and 4). However, our calculations show that for corn and wheat, acreage increases in these countries/regions are mostly offset by declines in the U.S. With an expectation of a continuing decline in U.S. wheat and corn plantings, we expect an insignificant growth in overall global wheat and corn acreage. For soybeans, however, the acreage expansion could pose a downside risk as all top three producers (the U.S., Brazil and Argentina) are likely to increase their plantings. We will re-evaluate the grain market at the end of March, when the U.S. posts its planting intentions for all major crops. Softs In 2017: Less Positive Than Grains Both cotton and sugar prices had strong rallies in 2016, following the second consecutive year of supply deficits (Chart 6). Global cotton acreage has declined 19% during the past five years when cotton prices fell significantly from peak prices in 2011. This is the main reason for the 18.3% decline in global cotton production during the same period of time and also for the two consecutive years of supply deficit in 2015 and 2016. For sugar, the El Niño phenomenon that ended this past summer hurt sugar plantings and crop development in major producing countries (Brazil, India, China and Thailand) in both 2015 and 2016, resulting in two years of supply deficit and a supercharged rally in 2016 sugar prices. Both cotton and sugar prices fell from their 2016 highs, with a 9.6% drop for cotton and a 23.4% decline for sugar. However, we are still tactically bearish on both commodities as speculators' net long positions are still crowed (Chart 7). Chart 6Cotton & Sugar: Supply Deficit in 2016 Chart 7Cotton & Sugar: Crowed Net Long Spec Positions Strategically, we are neutral cotton and bearish sugar. For cotton, global demand will stay sluggish in 2017. Even though there has been no growth at all in global cotton demand for the past three years, the bad news is that there still are no signs of improvement in global textile demand (Chart 8). On the supply side, global cotton output may rise significantly next year, if farmers shift some of their grain acreage to cotton due to a better profit profile for cotton (Chart 9). We believe, barring extreme weather, the global cotton market will become more balanced next year, leaving us neutral in our price outlook. For sugar, with weather patterns back to normal and the extreme rally in prices this year, sugar output in India, Thailand, China and the EU (European Union) should receive a strong boost. In addition, a strengthening U.S. dollar will also encourage sugar production in those countries whose currency had massive depreciation like Brazil, Russia and India (Chart 10). Chart 8Cotton: Demand Does Not Look Good Chart 9Cotton: Supply Will Increase In 2017 Chart 10Sugar Production Will Recover On the demand side, average global sugar consumption growth was only 1.3% p.a. during 2013-2015, even though average sugar prices declined every year during that period. This year, global demand growth slowed to only 0.6%, as average sugar prices were 35% higher than last year. If sugar prices go sideways, the average prices will still be higher than this year, which may result in an even slower growth in global sugar demand. Given an extremely oversupplied corn market, cheaper corn syrup will replace sugar in its industrial uses. Chart 11Ag Investment Strategies: ##br##Focus On Relative-Value Trades Our calculations indicate the global sugar market is likely to have a supply surplus next year, which will be a big shift from this year's supply deficit. This likely will pressure sugar prices lower. Upside Risks To Our Softs View Both the cotton and sugar markets are still in supply deficits, which means any unfavorable weather in the major producing countries could send prices sharply higher. For sugar, Brazilian sugarcane mills could favor ethanol production instead of sugar in 2017 if the country keeps hiking gasoline prices and promotes ethanol consumption. So far, the sugar/ethanol price ratio in Brazil still favors sugar production. This can change quickly if ethanol prices in Brazil rise faster than sugar prices in 2017. We will monitor this risk closely. Investment Strategy Our Ag strategies continue to focus on relative-value investments. As such, we look to go long wheat versus cotton, long corn versus sugar, and long rice versus soybeans through the following recommendations: Long July/17 wheat vs. short July/17 cotton: We recommend putting this relative trade on if the wheat-to-cotton ratio drops to 5.75 (current: 6.14) (Chart 11, panel 1). Long July/17 corn vs. short July/17 sugar: We put a limit-buy order at 17 on this position on November 3, 2016. Since then, this ratio rose 12.8% and only declined to 17.47 on November 9. Now, we suggest initiating this position if the ratio falls back to 18.5 (Chart 11, panel 2). Long November/17 rice vs. short November/17 soybeans: We recommend putting this relative-value trade on if the ratio drops to 0.95 (current: 1.01) (Chart 11, panel 3). Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades
Highlights The U.S. dollar will continue to appreciate while the RMB will depreciate further. This is a bad omen for EM risk assets, commodities, and global late cyclical equity sectors. Gold often leads oil and copper prices. Investors should heed the current downbeat message from gold. EM credit spreads have become detached from fundamentals and are unreasonably tight. Continue overweighting the Indian bourse within an EM equity portfolio. A new equity trade: long Indian software stocks / short the EM overall index. Feature There are several major discrepancies in financial markets that in our view are unsustainable. 1. The gap between EM equity breadth, USD, RMB and EM share prices One way to measure equity market breadth is to compare performance of equal-weighted versus market cap-weighted stock price indexes. Based on this measure, EM stock market breadth has been deteriorating. Poor breadth often heralds a major selloff (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Poor EM Equity Breadth Heralds A Major Selloff Remarkably, the same measure for the U.S. stock market shows improving breadth. The relative performance of equally-weighted EM stocks against U.S. equity indexes - a measure of breadth in relative performance - can also be a reliable marker for the relative performance of market cap-weighted indexes. It has plummeted to a new low pointing to new lows in EM versus U.S. relative share prices. In addition, a surging U.S. dollar has historically meant lower EM share prices (Chart I-2). We doubt this time is different. Finally, EM risk assets have decoupled from the RMB/USD exchange rate as well. The RMB has been depreciating and China's domestic corporate and government bond yields have spiked. As a result, the on-shore bond prices in RMB terms have plummeted (Chart I-3). Chart I-2A Rising U.S. Dollar Is ##br##A Bad Omen For EM Chart I-3China's On-Shore Corporate Bond##br## Prices Have Crashed Experiencing considerable losses on their favorite financial investment of the past year, bonds, Chinese investors, as well as households and companies, could opt to switch into U.S. dollars. The stampede into the U.S. dollar could start as early as January when the annual US$ 50,000 quota per person becomes available. It is hard to see what the government will do to preclude this rush and massive flight towards U.S. dollars. In China, households' and corporates' RMB deposits in the banking system amount to RMB 122 tn or US$17.5 tn. Hence, the PBoC's foreign exchange reserves including gold at US$ 3.2 tn are only equal to 18.5% of these deposits at the current exchange rate. Bottom Line: The U.S. dollar will appreciate and the RMB will depreciate. This is a bad omen for EM share prices and other risk assets. 2. Oil and copper prices deviating from gold prices Historically, when gold and oil prices have diverged, gold in most cases has proven more forward looking, with oil prices ultimately converging toward gold prices. Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B illustrate past episodes of gold and oil decoupling (in the 1980, 1990s and 2008), each of which were resolved via oil prices gravitating toward gold prices. Chart I-4AGold Led Oil Prices Chart I-4BGold Led Oil Prices In short, if history is any guide, the current gap between gold and oil prices will likely close via lower oil prices (Chart I-5, top panel). The same holds true for the recent divergence between gold and copper prices (Chart 5, bottom panel). We identified four historical periods when gold and copper prices diverged. In each case, it was copper prices that amended their trajectory and aligned with the direction of gold prices (Chart I-6A and 6B). Chart I-5Divergence Between Oil, Copper And Gold Chart I-6AGold Led Copper Prices Too Chart I-6BGold Led Copper Prices Too In sum, historically there have been a number of episodes when gold has led both oil and copper prices. Investors should heed the current downbeat message from gold. Chart I-7China: Dichotomies The underlying rationale could be that gold responds to monetary/liquidity conditions (gold is very sensitive to U.S. TIPS (real) yields) while oil and copper are more sensitive to growth conditions. Tightening in monetary/liquidity conditions often precedes a growth relapse. This could be the reason why gold has led oil and copper prices on several occasions in the past. 3. Dichotomies in China's industrial economy There are two types of dichotomies underway within China's industrial economy: The first is between industrial activity and industrial commodities prices. Commodities prices have surged, but the pace of manufacturing production has not improved at all (Chart I-7). There have been major discrepancies among various segments of China's industrial economy, with utilities surging and the technology sector remaining robust, and many others stagnating. The decoupling between industrial activity and industrial commodities prices can be explained by financial speculation and supply cutbacks. The former is unsustainable, while the latter is reversing as the government is gradually lifting restrictions on supply for coal and steel. The second is between the private- and state-owned parts of the industrial sector. The state-owned segment has experienced a meaningful improvement in output, while private companies in the industrial sector have seen their output growth weaken, albeit the growth rate is higher than in the SOE sector. (Chart I-7, bottom panel). As China's fiscal and credit impulses wane,1 activity in the state-owned industrial segment will relapse anew. 4. EM credit spreads diverging from EM currencies and credit fundamentals EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads (credit markets) are once again proving very resilient, despite the renewed selloff in EM currencies (Chart I-8). EM credit markets have defied deteriorating EM credit fundamentals in the past several years. Below we identify several divergences and anomalies within the EM credit space that give us confidence that EM credit markets have become detached from fundamentals, and that their risk-reward profile is poor. Chart I-8EM Credit Markets And EM Currencies:##br## A Widening Dichotomy Chart I-9EM Corporate Financial Health:##br## Not Much Improvement The EM Corporate Financial Health (CFH) Indicator has stabilized, but remains at a very depressed level (Chart I-9, top panel). This amelioration is largely due to the profit margin component. The other three components have not improved (Chart I-9, second panel). The valuation model based on the EM CFH indicator shows that EM corporate spreads are far too tight (Chart I-10). Chart I-10EM Corporate Bonds Are Expensive The strong performance of EM credit markets in recent years has been justified by the persistence of low bond yields in developed markets (DM). Yet the latest spike in DM bond yields has so far not caused EM credit spreads to widen. We expect U.S./DM government bond yields to rise further, and the U.S. dollar to continue to strengthen. This, along with potential broad-based declines in commodities prices, should lead to material widening in EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads in early 2017. With respect to unsustainable discrepancies, the case in point is Brazil. The country's sovereign and corporate spreads have tightened a lot this year, even though economic activity continues to shrink. The country has had numerous boom-bust cycles in the past 100 years, yet this depression is the worst on record. In fact, the nation's economic growth and public debt dynamics are worse than at any time during the past 20 years. Yet, at 300 basis points, sovereign spreads are well below the 1000-2500 basis point trading range that prevailed in the second half of 1990s and early 2000s (Chart I-11). Remarkably, the economy's pace of contraction has lately intensified (Chart I-12). This will likely worsen government revenues and lead to further widening in the fiscal deficit - making debt dynamics unsustainable. Another absurd credit market divergence is between China's sovereign CDS and Chinese offshore corporate spreads. Sovereign CDS spreads have been widening, but corporate credit spreads remain very tight (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Brazil: Dichotomy Between Sovereign ##br##Spreads And Fundamentals Chart I-12Brazil's Economy: ##br##No Improvement At All Chart I-13Chinese Sovereign CDS And ##br##Off-Shore Corporate Spreads Yet there is much more risk in Chinese corporates than in government debt. The corporate sector commands record leverage of 165% of national GDP, while public debt stands at 46% of GDP. Besides, the central government in China will always have immediate access to domestic or foreign debt markets, while some corporations could lose access to financing if creditors question their creditworthiness and decide to tighten credit. There is no rational case to support the rise in sovereign CDS when corporate spreads are tame. The only feasible explanation is that investors - who are invested in Chinese corporate bonds, and are not interested in selling them - are buying sovereign CDS to tactically hedge their credit exposure. If and when market sentiment sours sufficiently, and credit spread widening is perceived durable and lasting, real money will sell corporate bonds, resulting in a major spike in corporate spreads. 5. Divergence between global late cyclicals and the U.S. dollar Another area where we detect that financial markets have lately become overly optimistic is in global late cyclicals - materials, machinery and energy stocks. Typically, the absolute share prices in these sectors correlate with the U.S. dollar exchange rate but they have lately diverged (Chart I-14). Furthermore, global machinery stocks in general, and Caterpillar's share price in particular, have lately staged significant gains, while their EPS and sales continue to plunge (Chart I-15). Notably, Caterpillar's sales have not improved, even on a rate-of-change basis. Chart I-14Global Late Cyclicals And The U.S. Dollar: ##br##Unsustainable Decoupling Chart I-15Global Machinery Sales And##br## Profits Continue Plunging EM including China capital spending in real terms is as large as the U.S. and EU capital spending combined (Chart I-16). If the EM and China capex cycle does not post a recovery, which is our baseline view, it will be hard for global late cyclical stocks to continue rallying based solely on the positive outlook for U.S. infrastructure spending and potential U.S. tax reforms. In short, global late cyclicals such as machinery, materials and energy stocks that performed quite well in 2016 are vulnerable to a major pullback as EM/Chinese capital spending disappoints on the back of credit growth deceleration. Notably, these global equity sectors have reached a major technical resistance that will likely become a ceiling for their share prices (Chart I-17). Chart I-16EM/China's Capex Is As Large As ##br##U.S. And Euro Area Combined Chart I-17Global Late Cyclicals Are ##br##Facing Technical Resistance 6. Decoupling between the South African rand and precious metals prices The South African rand's recent resilience - despite the considerable drop in precious metal prices - is unprecedented (Chart I-18, top panel). Similarly, the rand has also decoupled from the exchange rate of another major metals producer: Australia (Chart I-18, bottom panel). We cannot think of any reason why these discrepancies can or should persist. Rising global bond yields and a broadening selloff in commodities prices should hurt the rand. In fact, the trade-weighted rand is facing a major technical resistance (Chart I-19) and will likely relapse sooner than later. Chart I-18Rand, AUD And ##br##Precious Metals Chart I-19Trade-Weighted Rand Is ##br##Facing Technical Resistance We reiterate our structural short position in the rand versus the U.S. dollar, and on October 12, 2016 initiated a short ZAR / long MXN trade. Traders should consider putting on these trades. Investment Strategy Chart I-20EM Relative Equity Performance ##br##Is Heading To New Lows Emerging markets share prices and currencies have been doing poorly since October, despite U.S. equity shares breaking out to new highs. In fact, almost all relative outperformance has been wiped out (Chart I-20). BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team expects further declines in EM share prices and currencies, as well as a selloff in domestic bonds and a widening of sovereign and corporate spreads. Absolute return investors should stay put, while asset allocators should maintain underweight positions in EM risk assets within respective global portfolios. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com India: Demonetization And Opportunities In Equities On November 8, India launched a demonetization program with the goal of removing the two most used banknotes - the 500 INR and 1000 INR banknotes - from circulation. Both banknotes accounted for roughly 85% of currency in circulation, which itself accounts for 13% of India's broad money supply. Moreover, almost 90%2 of retail transactions in India are cash-reliant. While around INR 13 trillion of notes (US$ 190 billion) have been deposited in the banking system as of December 10, only INR 5 trillion of new notes have been issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India is unlikely to turn cashless overnight. According to a Harvard Business Review article,3 less than 10% of Indians have ever used non-cash payment instruments. Likewise, less than 2% of Indians have used a cellular phone to receive a payment. This implies cash shortages could persist for a while and will have a significant impact on short-term economic activity. There are numerous reports that layoffs and business shutdowns have ensued in several industries, particularly in the informal economy (Chart II-1). The service sector PMI already dipped below 50 in November and the manufacturing PMI fell as well (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Very Weak Employment Outlook Chart II-2Indian PMIs Are Sinking Having boomed over the past year, motorcycle sales growth is now waning. Similarly, passenger and commercial vehicle sales - that have been anemic - will now dip. However, the consumption slowdown should not continue beyond the next couple of months. As more currency is supplied by the RBI, economic activity will rebound - particularly household spending. Pent-up demand will be unleashed as money circulation is restored. Nevertheless, investment expenditures are the key factors for improving productivity and, hence, as non-inflationary growth potential. Capital spending had been anemic in India well before the demonetization program was announced (Chart II-3). The reason for such lackluster investment expenditure lies in the fact that past investment projects taken on by highly leveraged Indian conglomerates have delivered poor performance. This translated into ever rising non-performing loans (NPLs) at state banks. Without debt restructuring and public bank recapitalization, a new capex cycle is unlikely in India. Consistently, credit to large industries is now contracting (Chart II-4) and foreign lending to Indian companies is declining. Chart II-3Indian Capex Is Anemic Chart II-4Banks Prefer Consumers We expect the demonetization program to hurt capital spending only mildly in the coming months, but do not expect a material bounce in investment afterward, unlike the one slated for household consumption. Indian share prices have more downside in absolute terms, as the market is still expensive and growth is slumping. Nevertheless, India will likely outperform the EM equity benchmark going forward (Chart II-5). Chart II-5Indian Share Prices: A Tapering Wedge The rationale for our overweight on Indian equities within the EM stock universe is due to the nation's much better macro fundamentals relative to those in many other EM. In particular, deleveraging and NPL write-offs are more advanced, the current account deficit is small, and India will benefit from potentially lower commodities prices. Within the Indian bourse, we recommend overweighting software stocks that will benefit from a revival in advanced economies' growth and a weaker currency. Besides, Indian software stocks are not exposed to the currently weak domestic consumption cycle and in fact might benefit from the push toward digitalization in banking. Bottom Line: Indian consumption will weaken in the coming three months or so, but will rebound thereafter. The capex cycle is weak and will remain subdued. Continue overweighting the Indian bourse within an EM equity portfolio. A new equity recommendation: long Indian software stocks / short the EM overall index. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst aymank@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Key EM Issues Going Into 2017," dated December 14, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Chakravorti, B., Mazzotta, B., Bijapurkar, R., Shukla, R., Ramesha, K., Bapat, D., &Roy, D. (2013). The cost of cash in India. Institute of Business in the Global Context, Fletcher School, Tufts University. 3 Chakravorti, B. (2016, December 14). India's Botched War on Cash. Retrieved from https://hbr.org Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
