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Dear clients, China Investment Strategy will take a summer break next week. We will resume our publication on September 9th. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights The threat of US sanctions has sparked fears of disconnecting Chinese financial institutions from US dollar access, driving urgency to accelerate the RMB internationalization process. China’s RMB internationalization process suffered from a sizable setback in 2016, but the trend has reversed in 2018. Since then China has shifted the strategy to broaden and enhance the RMB’s market demand and functions, as well as to establish systems to facilitate the strategy. In the foreseeable future, the RMB’s role in the global economy is far from challenging the US dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency; China's near-term goal to promote the use of the RMB beyond its borders is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities threatened by US financial sanctions. Feature Since 2018 and in the wake of intensifying confrontations between the US and China, the Chinese government has shifted its strategy in promoting the internationalization of the RMB. Authorities have moved from a symbolic international recognition of the RMB to a more pragmatic approach of creating real market demand for the currency. Chart 1China Has Been Shedding USD Assets It is not our baseline view that the US will take extreme measures and entirely cut off Chinese banks’ access to the US Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). However, Beijing’s decoupling from the US dollar (USD) has been in process, diversifying its forex reserves away from the US dollar (USD) and increasing the use of the RMB in cross-border trade and investment (Chart 1). In the foreseeable future, it is neither possible nor is Chinese policymakers’ intention for the RMB to challenge the USD as the world's dominant reserve currency. Rather, we think that under the threat of US sanctions, the near-term goal is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities. At the same time, the approach will make China “too big, too connected to fail” in the medium-to-long run and, therefore, minimize the potential for future threats of financial sanctions. China’s new approach to internationalize the RMB involves enhancing the currency’s three functions in the global market, and establishing and strengthening domestic systems to facilitate the enhancements: The RMB as an international settlement currency; The RMB as a commodity pricing currency; and The RMB as an international reserve currency. Most of these strategies still have a long way to go before having significant global market implications. However, these developments bear structural importance and investors should closely monitor them. RMB - An International Settlement Currency Chart 2Cross-Border RMB Settlement Is Picking Up The RMB’s role in cross-border trade settlement suffered a major setback in 2016 when investor confidence plummeted following a rapid devaluation in China’s currency and equities. The trend has reversed since 2018, partially due to the vigorous promotion of China’s domestic cross-border interbank settlement system (CIPS) (Chart 2). China established CIPS in 2015 after the US proposed to disconnect Russia from the SWIFT payment system.1 As of July 2020, the CIPS system had a total of 33 direct participants and 951 indirect participants, a 35% increase from 2018 with more than half of the participants outside China.2 According to the recently released PBoC RMB internationalization report, the CIPS system processed a total of 34 trillion yuan worth of cross-border RMB transactions in 2019, a 28% improvement from 2018 (Chart 3). Chart 3CIPS Has Been Steadily Expanding Nevertheless, the RMB’s share of international payments remains far behind the USD, euro and yen, and the RMB's role in cross-border settlement is well below its 2016 peak (Chart 4A and 4B). The dollar's dominant status is not only supported by the US’ strong and open economy, but also by its deep, liquid and highly efficient financial markets, which are impossible for any currencies or payment systems to replicate in the near future. However, establishing domestic financial payment and information exchange systems will likely be a main countermeasure countries will rush to take, if the US launches sanctions to cut off large economies like Russia and China from the USD and/or global financial system. Chart 4AThe RMB’s Share Of International Payments Has Been Disproportional Compared To Its Share In Global Trade… Chart 4B...And Well Below Its 2016 Peak Chart 5Russia Has Largely Replaced USD Treasury Holdings With Gold Russia is by far the largest and most globally integrated country that came close to being cut off from SWIFT, and Beijing has clearly learned from Russia’s experience and countermeasure strategies. The proposal to disconnect Russia from SWIFT following the 2014 Crimea crisis never materialized, but in light of the threats and US financial sanctions, Russia established the SPFS, a domestic financial information exchange system to facilitate bank payments. The SPFS is far from the complete emancipation of SWIFT and payments through the SPFS are mostly intra-Russian settlements. However, this active counter-sanction measure, coupled with the Russian central bank’s aggressive reduction of USD-denominated assets in its forex reserves, seems to have achieved positive results (Chart 5). Three years after the establishment of SPFS, the US and Europe no longer target Russian bank payment functions in their further financial sanctions against Russia.3 In response to a US threat to impose economic sanctions against companies and banks dealing with Iran, Europe created a special financial settlement platform called Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in 2019. Although none of the alternative systems can challenge the role of the US CHIPS or SWIFT systems, the trend of establishing and accelerating alternatives will incrementally diminish the effectiveness of such harsh financial actions by the US. RMB - An International Commodity Pricing Currency Table 1China Dominates Global Demand For Many Commodities We believe that the most important breakthrough in the RMB internationalization process in the past five years has been the strategic shift to promote the RMB’s pricing function. China is the largest trading partner of a growing number of countries with tightly linked supply chains. This generates a natural demand for RMB settlement in bilateral trade. More importantly, China’s dominance in global demand for bulk commodities gives the country an advantage in pricing power (Table 1). In March 2018, China established a RMB-denominated crude oil futures market in Shanghai, which has grown into the third-largest oil exchange market after WTI and Brent. Its cumulative turnover in two years reached nearly 30 trillion yuan with overseas customers in 19 countries and regions.4 Given the success of the Shanghai crude oil futures market, the Chinese government has been vigorously promoting the expansion of the RMB pricing function from crude oil to natural gas, iron ore, soybeans, corn and other bulk commodities. Going forward, we expect the RMB internationalization process to continue to develop through pricing and trading bulk commodities in Chinese currency. This will lead to a higher correlation between the RMB and the currencies of some of China's Asian neighbors and commodity trade partners, and thus expand and strengthen the "RMB currency bloc" (Chart 6A and 6B). Chart 6AThe RMB Currency Bloc May Expand From Manufacturing Ecosystem... Chart 6B...To Commodity Supply Chain RMB - An International Reserve Currency The role of the RMB among official reserve managers, although still dismal compared to the USD and Euro, has accelerated since 2018. Its global share has doubled from Q4 2016 when the IMF began to include holdings of RMB in its currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) (Chart 7). Shares of the USD- and Euro-denominated reserves have remained unchanged or declined during the same period. Among private investors, foreign investment in RMB-denominated assets has been the main source of China’s financial account surplus (Chart 8). China has hastened the opening of its onshore financial market to foreign institutional investors. In the past two years, major global stock and bond indexers –including MSCI, the S&P Dow Jones Indices, the FTSE Russell, and the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index – have added A-shares and onshore bonds to their flagship benchmarks. This means that foreign institutional investors have significantly boosted their allocation of RMB-denominated stocks and bonds (Chart 8, bottom panel). Financial assets, such as domestic RMB stocks, bonds, and loans and deposits held by foreign entities, climbed by 26.7% in 2019 over 2018. At the same time, China's domestic financial markets have gradually liberalized and even removed investment quotas for overseas institutional investors. Foreign investors currently account for 5.5% and 2.6% of the market value in Chinese equities and bonds, up from 3% and 2% in 2018, respectively. Chart 7The RMB Share In Global Reserves Remains Dismal, But Has Nearly Doubled Since 2016 Chart 8China Has Been Rapidly Expanding The Scope Of Foreign Participants In Its Onshore Financial Markets Bottom Line: The internationalization of the RMB will likely continue to accelerate in the face of decoupling from the US. It is a long process, but China will take advantage of its dominance in global demand to foster the RMB's role in both pricing and settlement in cross-border commodity trade. At the same time, China is rapidly expanding the scope of foreign participants in the country's onshore financial markets, by allowing more foreign banks and financial institutions to enter the market, and broadening the channels for the RMB’s international circulation. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1SWIFT is a system that provides information on international payments and calculations. The system unites more than 11,000 banking and financial institutions in 210 countries and the bank card payment function supported by the SWIFT system reflects a country's financial security. 2China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System release, July 31st, 2020. 3Xu Wenhong, The SWIFT System: A Focus on the U.S.–Russia Financial Confrontation, Russian International Affairs Council, February 3, 2020. 4Based on data from Shanghai International Energy Exchange. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
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Highlights Global Credit Spreads: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the rout in February and March has driven corporate spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the coronavirus and US politics. Credit Strategy: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Feature Chart of the WeekA Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned Global credit markets have enjoyed a spectacular recovery from the carnage seen just five months ago when investors realized the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Investment Grade Corporate index has tightened from the 2020 high of 326bps to 130bps, while the OAS on the Global High-Yield index has narrowed from the 2020 high of 1192bps to 556bps. Unsurprisingly, those spread peaks both occurred on the same day: March 23, the day the US Federal Reserve announced their corporate bond buying programs. We have described the Fed’s actions as effectively removing the “left tail risk” of investing in credit, and not just in the US, by introducing a central bank liquidity backstop to the US corporate bond market. The backdrop for global credit markets, on the surface, seems typical for sustained spread compression (Chart of the Week). Economic optimism is buoyant, with the global ZEW expectations index now at the highest level since 2014. Monetary conditions are highly supportive, with near-0% policy rates across all developed economies and the balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England growing at a combined year-over-year pace of 46%. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. The next moves in credit will be more challenging and less rewarding than the past five months. Investment grade corporate credit spreads no longer offer compelling value in most developed economies, while high-yield spreads are tightening in the face of rising default rates in the US and Europe. While additional spread tightening is not out of the question in these markets, investors should consider rotating into credit sectors that still offer some relative value – like emerging market (EM) hard currency corporates. A World Tour Of Our Spread Valuation Indicators The sharp fall in global bond yields over the past several months has not just been confined to government debt. Yields have fallen toward, and even below, pre-virus lows for a variety of sectors ranging from US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to EM USD-denominated sovereign debt (Chart 2). Investors are clearly reaching for yield in the current environment of tiny risk-free government bond yields, with no greater sign of this than the recent new issue by a US sub-investment grade borrower of a 10-year bond with a coupon below 3%.1 The drop in credit yields has also occurred alongside tightening credit risk premiums, although spreads remain above the pre-virus lows for most sectors in the US, Europe and EM (Chart 3). The degree of correlation across global credit markets has been intense, with very little differentiation between countries. Investment grade corporate spreads in the US, UK and euro area are all closing in on 100bps; high-yield spreads in those same regions are all around 500bps. Chart 2Global Credit Yields Are Low Chart 3Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Last week, we introduced the concept of “yield chasing” to describe how the ranking of returns in developed market government bonds was becoming increasingly correlated to the ranking of outright yield levels.2 We have seen a similar dynamic unfold in global credit markets, especially since that peak in spreads in late March. In Chart 4 and Chart 5, we present the relationship between starting benchmark index yields, and the subsequent excess returns over risk-free government bonds, for a variety of developed market and EM credit products. The first chart covers the time from start of 2020 to the March 23 peak in spreads, while the second chart shows the relationship since then. The two charts are mirror images of each other. Chart 4Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (January 1 To March 20) Chart 5Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (Since March 23) The worst performing markets in the first three months of the year were those with the highest yield to begin 2020: high-yield corporates in the US and Europe along with EM credit, which have been the best performing markets since late March. The opposite is true for lower yielders like investment grade credit in Japan, the euro area and Australia, which were among the top performers before March 23 and have lagged sharply since then. While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Chart 6Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Measures of bond volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury options prices have declined to pre-pandemic lows, while the VIX index of US equity volatility is now down to 22 from the 2020 peak around 80 (Chart 6). The excess return volatility of US corporate bond markets has followed suit, thus allowing for lower US credit spreads. Even allowing for the lower levels of overall market volatility, corporate credit spreads do look relatively tight in the US and Europe. The ratio of the US investment grade index OAS to the VIX is now one standard deviation below the median since 2000 (Chart 7). A similar reading exists for the ratio of the US high-yield index OAS to the VIX, which is also one standard deviation below the long-run average (bottom panel). In the euro area, the ratios of investment grade and high-yield OAS to European equity volatility, the VStoxx index, are not as stretched as in the US, but remain below long-run median levels (Chart 8). Chart 7Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Chart 8Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol While these simple comparisons of spread to market volatility suggest that corporate credit spreads are tight in most major markets, other indicators paint a more nuanced picture of cross-market valuations. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads is the 12-month breakeven spread. That measures the amount of spread widening that must occur over a one-year horizon for a credit product to have the same return as government bonds. In other words, how much must spreads increase to eliminate the carry advantage of a credit product over a risk-free bond, after accounting for the volatility of that product. We compare those 12-month breakeven spreads with their own history in a percentile ranking, which determines the attractiveness of spreads. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. A look at breakeven spread percentile rankings for the major credit groupings in the US (Chart 9), euro area (Chart 10) and EM (Chart 11) shows more diverging spread valuations. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 10Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 11EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings The US investment grade breakeven spread is just below the 25th percentile of their long-run history, although the high-yield breakeven spread remains in the top quartile of its history. Euro area breakeven spreads are “fairly” valued, both sitting around the 50th percentile. The EM USD-denominated sovereign breakeven spread is in the third quartile below the 50th percentile, while the EM USD-denominated corporate breakeven spread looks better, sitting just at the 75th percentile. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. We would not be surprised to see US investment grade spreads tighten back to the previous cyclical low at some point in the next 6-12 months. There are more compelling opportunities in other global credit markets, however, especially on a risk-adjusted basis. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. Bottom Line: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the out in February and March has driven credit spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the virus and US politics. Spread valuations are looking more stretched, but “yield chasing” and “spread chasing” behavior will remain dominant with central banks encouraging risk-seeking behavior with easy money policies. Putting It All Together: Recommended Allocations One way to look at the relative attractiveness of global spread product sectors is to compare them all by 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. We show that in Chart 12, not just for the overall credit indices by country but also among credit tiers within each country. Sectors rated below investment grade are in red to differentiate from higher-quality markets. Chart 12Global Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads, Ordered By Percentile Ranks The main conclusion form the chart is that there is a lot of red on the left side and none on the right side. That means junk bonds in the US and Europe have relatively high breakeven spreads, while investment grade credit in most countries have relatively lower breakeven spreads. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. To further refine the cross-country comparisons, we must look at those breakeven spreads relative to the riskiness of each sector. In Chart 13, we present a scatter graph plotting the 12-month breakeven spreads versus our preferred measure of credit risk, duration-times-spread (DTS), for all developed market corporate credit tiers, as well as EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The shaded region represents all values within +/- one standard error of the fitted regression line. Thus, sectors below that shaded region have breakeven spreads that are low relative to its DTS, suggesting a poor valuation/risk tradeoff. The opposite is true for sectors above the shaded region. Chart 13Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) The sectors that stand out as most attractive in this framework are B-rated and Caa-rated US high-yield, and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The least attractive sectors are US investment grade corporates, for both the overall index and the Baa-rated credit tier. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. Looking beyond the spread and volatility measures presented in this report, we must consider the default risk of high-yield bonds. Our preferred measure of valuation that incorporates default risk is the default-adjusted spread, which measures the current high-yield index spread net of default losses. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. The current US high-yield default-adjusted spread is now well below its long-run average (Chart 14). We expect a peak US default rate over the next year between 10-12% (levels seen after past US recessions) and a recovery rate given default between 20-25% (slightly below previous post-recession levels). That combination would mean that expected default loses from the COVID-19 recession could exceed the current level of the US high-yield index spread by as much as 400bps (see the bottom right of the chart). Given that risk of default losses overwhelming the attractiveness of US high-yield as measured by the 12-month breakeven spread, we prefer to stay up in quality by focusing on Ba-rated names within an overall neutral allocation to US junk bonds. For euro area high-yield, where default-adjusted spreads are also projected to be negative next year but with less attractive 12-month breakeven spreads, we recommend a cautious up-in-quality allocation to Ba-rated names only but within an overall underweight allocation. After ruling out increasing allocations to US B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield, that leaves the two remaining valuation outliers from Chart 13 - US investment grade and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The gap between the index OAS of the two has narrowed from the March peak of 446bps to the latest reading of 259bps (Chart 15). We believe that gap can narrow further towards 200bps, especially given the supportive EM backdrop of USD weakness and China policy stimulus – both factors that were in place during the last sustained period of EM corporate bond outperformance in 2016-17. Chart 14No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY Chart 15EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG We upgraded our recommended allocation to EM USD-denominated credit out of US investment grade back in mid-July, and we continue to view that as the most attractive relative value opportunity in global spread product on a risk/reward basis. Bottom Line: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-10/u-s-junk-bond-market-sets-record-low-coupon-in-relentless-rally 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy service observes that the correlation between relative global government bond returns and yield levels is becoming more positive. The trend should continue as long as policymakers stick to their promises and…

