Labor Market
Highlights Treasury yields have tumbled despite a solid U.S. economy: The 10-year Treasury bond yielded just under 3% when we started beating the below-benchmark-duration drum last summer; now it’s hovering around 2.3%. The golden rule of bond investing argues against positioning for further declines, … : The returns to duration strategies hinge on the difference between actual and expected moves in the fed funds rate. With the money market looking for two cuts over the next twelve months, the fed funds rate is more likely to surprise to the upside than the downside. … but could a lack of borrowing keep yields low?: If debt-fueled spending has gone out of fashion in the U.S., global savings could overwhelm investment, and rates might have to fall further to bring them back into balance. Feature The ride has gotten bumpier as the trade tensions between the U.S. and China have heated up, but our recommendations have held up well since last summer. Equal-weighting equities, underweighting bonds and overweighting cash helped preserve capital during the fourth-quarter selloff, while our early and late January upgrades of equities (while downgrading cash) and spread product (while further downgrading Treasuries), respectively, have proven to be beneficial.1 On a total return basis, the S&P 500 is up over 12% since our upgrade, and the Barclays Bloomberg Corporate and High Yield Indexes have generated excess returns over Treasuries of around 175 and 75 basis points (“bps”), respectively, despite ceding much of their previous leads.2 Even the TIPS ETF (TIP) has held its own with the equivalent-duration nominal-Treasury ETF (IEF). The below-benchmark duration call has eroded some of the overall outperformance, however, and there has been some debate within BCA about whether or not we should change the view. We still do not believe the monetary policy outlook merits a duration-view change. We remain constructive on the outlook for global growth, despite the escalation in tensions between U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators, and therefore do not see a fundamental reason to expect lower real rates. The idea that soft credit growth could hold rates down is interesting, but one would have to believe the spendthrift U.S. leopard really has changed its spots to position a portfolio in line with it. Fed Policy Chart 1Caution: Falling Rate Expectations As of Thursday’s close, the money market was pricing in a 100% chance of a 25-bps rate cut by Thanksgiving, a 100% chance of a 50-bps rate cut by this time next year, and a 45% chance of a third cut by Thanksgiving 2020 (Chart 1, bottom panel). The FOMC has paused its rate-hiking campaign, to be sure, but the idea that it will soon embark on a rate-cutting campaign seems like a stretch. The minutes from the FOMC’s April 30th-May 1st meeting, released last week, painted a picture of a fundamentally solid economy. The balance between hawks and doves remained roughly equal, with “a few participants” calling for a coming need to firm policy, given the swiftness with which inflation pressures can build in a tight labor market, while “a few other participants” noted that the unemployment rate is not the be-all and end-all measure of resource utilization. From an investment strategy perspective, we think our U.S. Bond Strategy service’s golden rule provides the best insight. Below-benchmark-duration positioning will outperform if the Fed cuts less (or hikes more) over the next twelve months than markets expect; above-benchmark-duration will win if the Fed cuts more (or hikes less) than markets expect. Some strategists within BCA have raised the possibility that market expectations could force the Fed’s hand. The reason that the Fed is especially loath to disappoint markets in what might be called the forward-guidance era of central banking, but we think there’s an important distinction between taking care not to surprise markets and surrendering one’s free will to them, as parents of young children can attest. Bottom Line: We think the money markets are significantly overestimating the possibility that the Fed will soon cut the fed funds rate, increasing the potential returns from below-benchmark-duration positioning. The Rates Checklist Table 1Rates View Checklist We developed our rates checklist3 to provide a list of real-time measures that bear on our rates view. Of the eleven items on the list, only three have met our threshold for reassessing our bearish rates call at any point over the last eight months, so we have stayed the course (Table 1). The checked boxes indicate that the evidence has been moving against us, though we would argue that the stingy 10-year Treasury yield has gotten overly carried away with discounting that evidence (Chart 1, top panel). Policy Perceptions The spread between our monetary policy expectations and the markets’ remains wide, so the prospective returns from our Fed call remain ample, and the first box remains unchecked. Thanks to last week’s two-day, 11-bps decline in the 10-year Treasury yield, we have again checked the inverted yield curve box, which first inverted for five days near the end of March, and has inverted for four days so far in May. Our empirical study of the inverted curve’s recession-signaling properties used month-end closes for the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, and found that an inverted curve had called the seven recessions that have occurred over the last 50 years with just one false positive (Chart 2). Now that the curve has inverted over a couple of daily stretches, clients have asked us just what constitutes bona fide inversion. Chart 2Accurate Yield Curve Signals Tend To Last Per the curve’s moves over the last 50 years, we would say inversion doesn’t issue an actionable signal until it persists for at least a few months (Table 2). 1998’s false alarm encompassed just seven days between late September and early October, and covered just one month end. The intuition behind the inverted yield curve’s predictive power is that the bond market sniffs out economic weakness before the Fed officially changes course. Recognizing that the Fed will have to begin cutting rates soon, bond investors buy longer-maturity instruments to reap the biggest rewards. Investors shouldn’t overreact to tentative inversions of the yield curve. Table 2Yield Curve Inversions We have argued that the next recession will not occur until the Fed has hiked the fed funds rate to a level above the equilibrium fed funds rate. Since we cannot observe the equilibrium rate in real time, we have looked to interest-rate-sensitive segments of the economy to gauge if higher rates are beginning to bite. Housing is on the front line of interest-rate sensitivity, and it remains quite affordable relative to history, suggesting that monetary policy has not yet become restrictive. Every time the inverted curve preceded a recession, the affordability index was below its long-run mean or rapidly making its way there (mid-1973); when the yield curve briefly inverted in September 1998, homes remained more affordable than average (Chart 3). Chart 3If Higher Rates Aren't Squeezing The Economy, The Yield Curve May Be Crying Wolf Inflation We concede that realized inflation measures (Chart 4), and inflation expectations as proxied by the difference in TIPS and nominal Treasury yields (Chart 5), have lost momentum since last summer. Washington’s unexpected grant of six-month waivers for importing Iranian oil caused crude prices to plunge, taking headline inflation measures and inflation expectations down with them (Chart 6). Given our Commodity And Energy Strategy team’s view that oil prices will extend their rebound across the rest of this year and into next, we expect that they will again move higher. Chart 4Consumer Price Indexes, ... chart 5... And Inflation Breakevens, ... Chart 6... Are Joined At The Hip With Oil Prices The Labor Market And Imbalances At Home And Abroad The labor market remains tight, so none of the labor market indicators argue for easier monetary policy and lower rates across the term structure. As far as the instability indicators go, there is as yet no sign of unsustainable activity in the economy’s key cyclical sectors. The Fed has stopped emphasizing the idea that financial sector imbalances alone might justify tighter policy, but anecdotal reports about lending standards suggest that potential vulnerabilities remain. There has not yet been an outbreak of major international distress that could deter the Fed from tightening policy, but worsening trade tensions and continued dollar strength would seem to make it slightly more likely. Bottom Line: We have checked a few boxes on our rates checklist, but the available evidence does not support adopting a more constructive view on rates. Hey, Big Spender The American consumer has long been a punching bag for Austrian School adherents and other moralists. As much as they scorn American households for living beyond their means, U.S. consumption has long played a symbiotic role in the global economy. As the engine powering the world’s largest economy, it makes an essential contribution to global aggregate demand, and provides an outlet for export powerhouses like China and Germany. An economy can only run a current account surplus provided that there are other economies running current account deficits capable of offsetting it. Measured inflation and inflation expectations were beginning to get some traction before oil collapsed upon the issuance of Iranian import waivers. In a recent blog post, former BCA Editor-in-Chief Francis Scotland posited that interest rates may not go anywhere as long as American households embrace their nascent post-crisis frugality. Using U.S. household demand as a proxy for global aggregate demand, Francis argues that if households don’t borrow and spend the way they did throughout the pre-crisis postwar era, global aggregate demand will suffer unless another profligate spender emerges to pick up the slack. Add China to the mix, and global savings could swamp global investment. Against that backdrop, savings and investment would only realign if rates fell. Newly frugal U.S. households may be helping to cap interest rates, but it’s too early to declare the end of the Debt Supercycle. Broadening the scope to include all public- and private-sector U.S. borrowing, the nominal 10-year Treasury yield has taken some cues from growth in aggregate borrowing (Chart 7). The relationship with real yields is not as strong (Chart 8), but if borrowing has some relationship to inflation, as under the guns-and-butter fiscal policy of the late sixties, nominal yields might well be a better measure. We can easily go along with the supply-and-demand intuition behind the observed relationship: when there’s stronger demand for credit, rates have to rise to entice savings and discourage investment to bring them back into balance, and vice versa. Chart 7Nominal Treasury Yields Have Been Tightly Linked With The Pace Of Loan Growth, ... Chart 8... And Real Yields Have Broadly Followed The Pattern As Well Government borrowing filled the void left by retrenching households and corporations in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. Household and corporate loan demand has been choppy since, however, and growth in aggregate borrowing has bumped around its mid-1950s lows throughout the expansion. We are not ready to declare that Americans have turned over a new, parsimonious leaf. The federal budget deficit soared following the passage of the stimulus package, and the CBO projects that it will continue to widen. Household debt growth is at its pre-crisis lows, but it has been accelerating ever since 2010 (Chart 9), and with debt service as a share of disposable income at its lowest level in at least 40 years, households have plenty of capacity to borrow. Chart 9Don't Count Consumers Out Just Yet Bottom Line: Interest rates have moved directionally with aggregate loan growth across the postwar era. Tepid loan demand growth may well keep a lid on rates, but we are not convinced that the Debt Supercycle has really breathed its last. Investment Implications Now that the 10-year Treasury yield has drifted back down to 2.3%, we believe the distribution of potential rate outcomes a year from now is skewed to the upside. We are thereby sticking with our recommendation that investors underweight Treasuries and maintain below-benchmark-duration positioning in all fixed-income portfolios. Even if there is not a clear catalyst on the immediate horizon for higher rates, we do not think that either the U.S. or the global economy is so fragile that investors should position for further rate declines. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the January 7 and January 28, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, “What Now?” and “Double Breaker,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 All return data calculated as of the Thursday, May 23rd close. 3 Please see the September 17, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “What Would It Take To Change Our Bearish Rates View?” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Duration: We see current bond market behavior as very similar to mid-2016, when heightened political uncertainty obscured the economy’s true strength and kept bond yields lower for longer than was justified by the economic fundamentals. The correct strategy at that time was to sell into the bond market’s strength, and we advocate a similar strategy today. China: Any attempt by the Chinese government to retaliate in the trade war by selling U.S. Treasury securities would be either self-defeating or ineffective, depending on the exact strategy employed. In either case, U.S. Treasury yields will be unaffected. Fed: At least part of the Fed’s dovish turn might represent a desire to send the labor share of national income higher. We introduce a new data series for Fed Watchers to track. Feature The Trump Administration fired the latest salvo in the trade war two weeks ago, expanding tariffs to a broader swathe of Chinese imports. Then last week, the escalation of tensions spilled over to the bond market, sending global yields abruptly lower. Chart 1Flight To Safety The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield bounced off 2.35% last Thursday and has since settled at 2.39% (Chart 1). Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve is now priced for 44 bps of Fed rate cuts over the next 12 months (Chart 1, bottom panel). It is possible, and even likely, that geopolitical tensions will keep yields low during the next month or two. In fact, our Geopolitical Strategy service places the odds of a complete breakdown in trade negotiations by the end of June at 50%.1 But we would encourage investors to sell into rallies, positioning for higher yields on a 6-12 month horizon. To see why, we return to a Weekly Report from early April where we walked through different factors that would be useful in the creation of a macroeconomic model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield.2 We consider what has changed during the past six weeks and what those developments mean for bond yields going forward. Back In The Bond Kitchen In early April, we ran through four different factors that should be included in any bond model and suggested macroeconomic indicators that best capture the trends in each. The four factors are: Global Growth: Best proxied by the Global Manufacturing PMI and Bullish Dollar Sentiment Policy Uncertainty: Best proxied by the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index Output Gap: Best proxied by Average Hourly Earnings Sentiment: Best proxied by the U.S. Economic Surprise Index We consider each factor in turn. Global Growth Chart 2Monitoring Global Growth The Global Manufacturing PMI, our preferred series for tracking global growth, ticked down during the past month, continuing the free-fall that has been in place since the end of 2017 (Chart 2). At 50.3, it is now only slightly above the 50 boom/bust line and is close to where it was in mid-2016, when the 10-year yield hit its cyclical low. But on a positive note, several leading indicators have hooked up in recent months, suggesting that the Global PMI could soon trough and move higher in the second half of the year. Specifically, the ZEW survey of global economic sentiment is off its lows, as is the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). Meanwhile, the Global LEI Diffusion Index has surged, indicating that 74% of the 23 countries in our sample are seeing improvement in their LEIs. Historically, the Global LEI Diffusion Index leads changes in both the Global LEI and the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 2, panel 3). Financial market prices that are highly geared to global growth had been singing a similar tune, but they rolled over as trade tensions flared during the past two weeks. For example, cyclical equity sectors recently started to underperform defensive sectors (Chart 2, bottom panel), and the important CRB Raw Industrials index took a nosedive. We place particular importance on the CRB Raw Industrials index as a timely indicator of global growth, because the ratio between the CRB index and gold correlates nicely with the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 3).3 Unsurprisingly, the ratio’s recent dip coincides with last week’s drop in the 10-year. Several leading indicators have hooked up in recent months, suggesting that the Global PMI could soon trough and move higher in the second half of the year. In addition to the Global Manufacturing PMI, we recommend including a survey of bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar in any bond model. More bullish dollar sentiment coincides with lower Treasury yields, and vice-versa. Our preferred survey shows that dollar sentiment remains elevated, but hasn’t changed much since April (Chart 4). The dollar itself, however, has begun to appreciate during the past two weeks (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 3A Falling CRB/Gold Ratio... Chart 4...And The Greenback Is On The Rise Bottom Line: The coincident global growth indicators that correlate best with bond yields – the Global Manufacturing PMI and Dollar Bullish Sentiment – are sending a similar message as in April. Meanwhile, leading economic indicators continue to suggest that we should expect improvement in the second half of the year. The biggest change from April is that global growth indicators derived from financial market prices – cyclical versus defensive equities, the CRB Raw Industrials index and the trade-weighted dollar – have responded negatively to heightened political risk. If this weakness persists and eventually infects the economic data, then it could prevent a second-half rebound in global growth, keeping Treasury yields low for even longer. Policy Uncertainty Spikes in the monthly Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index often cause capital to seek out the safety of U.S. Treasuries, and we recommend including this index in any macroeconomic bond model (Chart 5A). Spikes in the monthly Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index often cause capital to seek out the safety of U.S. Treasuries. While there have been no updates to the monthly index since the trade war’s recent escalation, one of its components – a daily index that tracks the number of relevant news stories – has surged during the past two weeks (Chart 5B). This clearly illustrates that a sharp increase in political uncertainty has been the catalyst for the bond market rally. Investors are obviously concerned that an ongoing and intensifying trade war might derail the economic recovery, and they are seeking out Treasuries as a hedge. Chart 5AGlobal Uncertainty Set To Spike Chart 5BMarkets Are Concerned In such situations, the traditional playbook is to fade any purely uncertainty-driven rally, on the view that markets tend to overreact to headline risk. This strategy worked well following the mid-2016 Brexit vote. The uncertainty shock from the vote sent the 10-year quickly down to 1.37%, but it then increased in the second half of the year when it became apparent that the economic recovery would continue. While higher tariffs will certainly be a drag on growth going forward, accommodative Fed policy and a probable increase in Chinese economic stimulus will mitigate the impact, keeping the economic recovery intact.4 Output Gap Chart 6Wages Are Headed Higher The output gap is a concept that represents where the economy is operating relative to its peak capacity, and its progress during the past three years is the main reason why bond yields will not re-test 2016 lows. We have found that wage growth is the most reliable way to measure the output gap: higher wage growth signals less spare capacity, and less spare capacity coincides with higher bond yields. We recommend Average Hourly Earnings as the best wage measure to include in any bond model. Since April, average hourly earnings growth has been roughly flat, but leading indicators suggest that further acceleration is highly likely in the coming months (Chart 6). While the Fed is keen to let wage growth accelerate, rising wage growth also makes a rate cut difficult to justify. The combination of rising wage growth and an on-hold Fed should put a rising floor under long-maturity bond yields. Sentiment The final factor that should be included in any bond model is sentiment. In April, we suggested that the U.S. Economic Surprise Index is the best measure of sentiment. When the surprise index has been deeply negative for a long time, it usually means that investors are downbeat on the economy and that the bar for a positive surprise is low. This has actually been the case in recent months, and our simple auto-regressive model suggests that the surprise index is biased higher (Chart 7). Positioning data confirm this message, and in fact show that investors are taking as much duration risk as they were when yields troughed in mid-2016 (Chart 8). Chart 7Low Bar For Positive Surprises Chart 8Similar Positioning As In Mid-2016 The overall message is that bond investors have a very dim view of the economy, and it will not take much positive news to send yields higher. Investment Strategy We see current bond market behavior as very similar to mid-2016, when heightened political uncertainty obscured the economy’s true strength and kept bond yields lower for longer than was justified by the economic fundamentals. The correct strategy at that time was to sell into the bond market’s strength, and we advocate a similar strategy today. Timing when the next move higher in bond yields will occur is difficult, but we take some comfort in the fact that the flatness of the yield curve makes it less costly than usual to carry below-benchmark duration positions. In fact, the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index is 7 bps higher than the average yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index. Bond investors have a very dim view of the economy, and it will not take much positive news to send yields higher. To further mitigate the cost of keeping duration low, we advocate taking duration-neutral positions that are short the belly (5-year & 7-year) part of the yield curve and long the very long and very short ends of the curve. Such trades are also provide a positive yield pick-up, and will earn capital gains when Treasury yields move higher.5 A Quick Note On China’s Treasury Purchases Chart 9Do Not Expect Treasuries To Be Used As A Weapon In This War The trade war’s recent escalation has led some to speculate that China could retaliate against higher tariffs by dumping U.S. Treasury securities onto the open market. The speculation only increased when the TIC data revealed that Chinese net Treasury purchases totaled -$24 billion in March, the most deeply negative figure since October 2016 (Chart 9). We see low odds that China will employ this tactic in the trade war, and no meaningful impact on Treasury yields in any case. To see why, let’s consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, China sells a large amount of U.S. Treasury securities and keeps the proceeds from the sales in its domestic currency. Assuming the amounts in question are sufficiently large, these transactions would cause the RMB to appreciate and lead to a tightening of Chinese monetary conditions. Tighter monetary conditions are exactly what the Chinese government does not want as it seeks to counteract the negative economic impact from tariffs. In fact, China is much more likely to engineer a further easing of monetary conditions, much like in 2015/16 (Chart 9, bottom panel). In the second scenario, China could sell U.S. Treasuries and purchase other foreign bonds (German bunds, for example). This would nullify any impact on Chinese monetary conditions, but it would not have much impact on U.S. Treasury yields. With Chinese money still flowing into global bond markets, the re-balancing would only push other investors out of non-U.S. bond markets and into U.S. Treasuries. Without changing the overall demand for global bonds, it is difficult to envision much of an impact on U.S. yields. Bottom Line: Any attempt by the Chinese government to retaliate in the trade war by selling U.S. Treasury securities would be either self-defeating or ineffective, depending on the exact strategy employed. In either case, U.S. Treasury yields will be unaffected. A New Data Series For Fed Watchers: Rich’s Ratio A number of recent Fed speeches have referred to the time series plotted in Chart 10: The share of national income going to labor, as opposed to corporate profits. Chart 10Introducing Rich's Ratio Vice-Chair Richard Clarida brought this analysis to the Fed, and the data series was actually once dubbed “Rich’s Ratio” by Clarida’s old PIMCO colleague Paul McCulley. The idea behind Rich’s Ratio is that while some late-cycle wage gains are passed through to prices, a portion also eat into corporate profits. Notice in Chart 10 that Rich’s Ratio has a tendency to rise late in the economic recovery. Based on his past writings, we would not be surprised if at least part of the Fed’s recent dovish turn represents a desire to send Rich’s Ratio higher, even if that goal might entail a modest overshoot of the Fed's 2 percent inflation target. We will have more to say about Rich’s Ratio in the coming weeks. For now, we simply want to make Fed Watchers aware that they have a new series to track. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Trump Became A War President”, dated May 17, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Kitchen”, dated April 9, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The rationale for why the CRB/Gold ratio tracks the 10-year Treasury yield is found in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Tarrified”, dated May 16, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
The labor market is so tight that it squeaks. The unemployment rate has fallen to a 49-year low; retiring baby boomers will cap the labor force participation rate around its current level; and discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers are few and…
Highlights We were on the road last week, discussing our economic and market outlooks: We met with a range of Midwestern clients who focus primarily on the U.S. A majority of our meetings were with fixed-income teams. The Fed will ultimately decide the fate of the expansion, … : Nearly everyone wanted to get a read on how much longer the expansion will last. We offered the view that the Fed will induce the next recession, provided that an exogenous event doesn’t beat it to the punch. … and inflation will be the catalyst that prompts the Fed to act: Inflation was typically far from investors’ minds, and several of our meetings centered on what will drive it, and where and when we expect it will show up. Feature We traveled throughout the Midwest last week, discussing our outlook for financial markets and the economy with a range of investors. We got the sense that our clients are constructive about the economy and are generally open to tilting portfolios in a risk-friendly direction, albeit somewhat grudgingly. They recognized the challenge that worsening U.S.-China trade relations would pose to a constructive call, but were content to wait for more information before adjusting their views or their portfolios. Our views continue to follow the outline we’ve laid out in our written reports. In the absence of economic or financial market excesses, or an exogenous shock that induces a material slowdown, we expect the expansion to roll on until the Fed begins to fear that it’s gone too far and imposes restrictive monetary policy settings to rein it in. Until it does, we expect that the equity bull market will continue and spread product will deliver positive excess returns over Treasuries. The investment strategy takeaway is that it is too early to de-risk portfolios. De-risking will become the order of the day once the Fed resumes tightening monetary conditions via rate hikes. There is currently no sign that the Fed is contemplating a meaningfully hawkish shift, but we expect that inflation pressures will eventually force its hand. Ten years of subdued inflation have made a mockery of recurring post-crisis inflation warnings, and clients have developed a robust immunity to them. What, they wanted to know, has changed enough to resuscitate inflation? Steroid-Fueled Demand Aggregate demand crashed during the crisis and was far short of the economy’s capacity when it bottomed in mid-2009. In economics lingo, that meant that the U.S. economy faced a sizable negative output gap when it embarked on the recovery/expansion. Although the economy grew at a tepid 2% rate over the ensuing decade, capacity grew even more slowly, held back by consistently weak capital expenditures, and the output gap finally closed around the beginning of 2018 (Chart 1), removing a stout inflation-absorbing buffer. Chart 1The Excess Capacity Cushion Is Gone The United States then poured fuel on the fire by injecting a significant quantity of stimulus into an economy that was already operating at capacity. Corporations and other businesses that viewed the pickup in aggregate demand as a one-off event refrained from expanding capacity to meet that demand, as it appeared as if it would be a poor use of capital. Imported goods from economies that still have excess capacity can relieve some of the pressure of inadequate domestic supply, but they’re unlikely to absorb all of the pressure from excess demand, even in the absence of new tariff barriers. The aggregate 2018-19 stimulus shapes up as a catalyst for higher prices. Capacity vastly exceeded demand when the economy began to turn around ten years ago, but the stimulus package has made it look a little thin. The trouble is that no one can pinpoint exactly when upward price pressures will reveal themselves. Inflation is the mother of all lagging indicators, peaking and bottoming well after business cycle transitions suggest it should (Chart 2). All we can say is that the steroid injection from the stimulus planted the seeds of inflation. Just when they’ll begin to sprout is uncertain, but we believe the Fed’s pause will give them a chance to take root. Wage Inflation The labor market is so tight that it squeaks. The unemployment rate has fallen to a 49-year low; baby boomer retirements will cap the labor force participation rate around its current level (Chart 3, top panel); and discouraged workers (Chart 3, middle panel) and involuntary part-time workers are few and far between (Chart 3, bottom panel). Now that it has been absorbed, the glut of idled workers will no longer serve as a buffer neutralizing upward wage pressures. The labor market is tight as a drum. The pool of discouraged workers and involuntary part-timers is smaller than it was at the last two cyclical peaks, while employer demand is more robust. Employees are starting to gain bargaining power. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicates that demand for new workers is intense. As a share of total filled positions, job openings are at an all-time high in the 18-year history of the series (Chart 4, middle panel). No one quits a job unless s/he has another one lined up, and it almost always requires higher pay to induce an employee to jump from Employer A to Employer B. The elevated quit rate thus reveals that employers are poaching workers from each other to meet that demand (Chart 4, bottom panel). After Employer B lures an employee away from Employer A, Employer A hires a worker from Employer C or Employer D, which now has an opening it needs to fill. The employment merry-go-round creates a self-reinforcing cycle pushing wages higher and endowing employees with newfound bargaining power. Chart 3With Fewer Workers On The Sidelines … Chart 4… Employers Have Turned To Poaching Self-sustaining wage gains could produce price-level increases via a demand-pull or a cost-push mechanism. In a demand-pull framework, businesses observing steady payroll expansions and increased household income may well attempt to push through selling price increases. Under cost-push, corporations raise prices in an attempt to offset increased labor costs. Then again, the pass-through from wage inflation to price inflation might not occur at all, as the dynamics of inflation are not fully understood. What The Fed Believes Investors may be frustrated by the lack of a clear connection between wages and prices, but they should not be put off by a little ambiguity – there would be no alpha without uncertainty. An absence of realized inflation does not eliminate the prospect of rate hikes. Our Inflation → Rate Hikes → Restrictive Monetary Policy → Recession → Bear Market roadmap may still come to pass. The first step in the chain would simply have to be perceived inflation as opposed to realized inflation, and it’s the Fed’s perception that drives monetary policy, not the public’s. As we stressed in our Special Report on the Phillips curve,1 there is no alternative explanation in mainstream economics connecting the dots between the elements of the Fed’s dual mandate. Every mainstream economic model posits an inverse relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. Every economist learned about the expectations-augmented Phillips curve multiple times in the course of his or her undergraduate and graduate studies. Until the profession settles on an alternative narrative, the Fed and other major central banks will be beholden to the Phillips curve. The connection between wages and prices is a mystery, but the Phillips curve’s place in mainstream economics remains secure. It’s easy to talk of patience when inflation has been hibernating for ten years, even with the unemployment rate at 49-year lows, but once wage gains begin to exceed 3.5% and 4%, we expect the Fed will change its tune. Wages do not respond to changes in the unemployment rate when there’s ample slack in the labor market, but they do once it becomes difficult to find employees. The varying sensitivity of changes in wages at different levels of unemployment explains the kink in the Phillips curve, but we found the NAIRU-based unemployment gap2 to be a reliable proxy for identifying the point at which the labor market meaningfully tightens (Chart 5). Chart 5NAIRU, … The natural rate of unemployment is only a concept, however, and the CBO series we use to calculate the unemployment gap is subject to retroactive adjustments intended to better match the CBO’s estimates with real-world observations. We therefore incorporated two alternative measures of labor market slack to test the robustness of the unemployment-gap framework. The first is the Jobs Plentiful/Jobs Hard To Get responses from the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey. The top panel of Chart 6 calculates the difference between Jobs Hard To Get and Jobs Plentiful; when it’s positive (negative), survey respondents are indicating that the labor market is soft (tight). The disparity in wage growth between the soft and the tight states, as estimated by the hoi polloi, is a little larger than under the CBO’s revised NAIRU estimates, suggesting Main Street may be better positioned to evaluate labor-market dynamics than D Street (the CBO’s address). Chart 6… The Consumer Confidence Survey, … To get away from the arbitrariness of the unemployment rate and the uncertainty of NAIRU estimates, we considered the employment gap from the perspective of the prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio (Chart 7). It also supports the conclusion that wage gains are a function of the degree of labor market slack, but the outlier results from the crisis render the mean non-employment ratio since 1985 a less-than-perfect boundary between tightness and slack. The prime-age (non-)employment-to-population ratio better fits the standard Phillips curve framework, producing a solidly linear relationship (Chart 8). It points to further wage gains as prime-age employment increases. Chart 7… And Prime-Age (Non-)Employment All Point To Faster Wage Gains If productivity continues to grow by leaps and bounds – the fourth-quarter gain was impressive, the first-quarter’s was eye-popping – the Fed won’t feel much pressure to hike rates. Productivity is a function of capital expenditures; workers are able to increase output when they’re provided with more and better tools. Capex has been extremely weak ever since the crisis in the U.S. and the rest of the world, however, and we do not think that investors should count on productivity remaining much above its low 1%-plus trend level of the last several years. Investment Implications The ultimate effect of the Fed’s pause will be to extend the duration of the expansion, assuming that an exogenous shock does not pull the plug on it. Extending the expansion will have the effect of extending the equity bull market, and the period in which spread product generates positive excess returns over Treasuries. There is no free lunch, and dovishness now will be offset by hawkishness later. Larger bull-market gains will ultimately be countered by larger bear-market losses. That is a concern for another day, however, and we continue to recommend that investors remain at least equal weight equities and spread product in balanced portfolios. We do not see a recession until the second half of 2020 at the earliest. Our best guess is that it will begin around the middle of 2021, so it is too early to de-risk portfolios or shift to a more defensive asset allocation profile. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Phillips Curve: Science Or Superstition?”, published February 26, 2019. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The unemployment gap in the top panel of Chart 5 is calculated by subtracting the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of NAIRU from the official unemployment rate. NAIRU, or the natural rate of unemployment (u*), is the minimum unemployment rate that would exist even in a full-employment economy. It results from structural factors like skill and geographic mismatches. The CBO currently estimates that NAIRU is 4.7%; the Fed’s dots suggest that it estimates u* is around 4.6%.
By creating 263 thousand jobs in April, the U.S. bested expectations of nearly 190 thousand. Moreover, the unemployment rate fell to 3.6% from 3.8%. The good news from the reports ends there. The fall in the unemployment rate mostly reflected the labor force…
Highlights 10-Year Yield: In this week’s report we run through different macro factors that could be used to create a macroeconomic model of the 10-year Treasury yield, and describe the current outlook for each one. On balance, the indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield is near its floor. Global Growth: Leading indicators have hooked up recently, suggesting that the Global Manufacturing PMI – a key driver of the 10-year Treasury yield – may rise in the coming months. Wages: Average hourly earnings softened in March, but survey measures suggest that wage growth remains in an uptrend. We show that rising wages have put considerable upward pressure on the 10-year yield in recent years, and should continue to do so going forward. Sentiment: The depressed Economic Surprise Index suggests that investor economic sentiment is downbeat. This means that the bar for positive data surprises (and higher bond yields) is relatively low. Feature Chart 1CRB/Gold Ratio On The Rise Treasury yields stabilized during the past week, and investors are trying to figure out whether the next big move will be higher or lower. We’re on the record as predicting that yields will eventually head higher, and have flagged the CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio as an important indicator to watch to time the next big move.1 Encouragingly, this indicator has risen during the past few weeks (Chart 1). Though the message from the CRB/Gold index is promising, the outlook for the 10-year Treasury yield remains uncertain. To shed some light on this important investment question, in this week’s report we run through different macroeconomic indicators that could be used to create a model of the 10-year Treasury yield. By performing this exercise out in the open, our goal is to present readers with a good way to think about the linkages between the economy and the 10-year Treasury yield. Recipe For A 10-Year Treasury Yield Model Ingredient #1: Growth Factors The first logical factor to include in any model of the 10-year Treasury yield is some measure of economic growth. We have found that the Global Manufacturing PMI is often highly correlated with the 10-year yield (Chart 2). Interestingly, the manufacturing PMI correlates more strongly with the 10-year yield than do the services or composite (manufacturing + services) PMIs. The Global PMI also correlates more strongly with the U.S. 10-year yield than does the U.S. PMI. It only takes a quick glance at the Global Manufacturing PMI to see why the 10-year Treasury yield fell this year. The Global PMI has been in a sharp downtrend for some time, driven mostly by the Euro Area and China. U.S. PMIs have also weakened in recent months, though they remain above levels seen in Europe and China. Another global growth indicator that correlates tightly with the 10-year Treasury yield is investor sentiment toward the U.S. dollar (Chart 3). Since the dollar is a countercyclical currency that appreciates when global growth slows and depreciates when it quickens, we observe that the 10-year Treasury yield tends to be lower when investors are extremely bullish on the U.S. dollar and higher when they are more bearish on the dollar. Chart 2Growth Factor Ingredient 1: Global Manufacturing PMI Chart 3Growth Factor Ingredient 2: Dollar Bullish Sentiment Notice in Charts 2 and 3 that the Global Manufacturing PMI and dollar bullish sentiment are both close to levels seen near the 10-year yield’s mid-2016 trough. At 50.6, the PMI is only slightly above its 2016 low of 49.9. Meanwhile, dollar bullish sentiment is currently 79%. It maxed out at 82% in 2016. Interestingly, despite the fact that our economic growth indicators paint a similar growth back-drop as 2016, the 10-year yield remains well above its mid-2016 low of 1.37%. Logically, we must conclude that some other “non-growth” factor is propping yields up (more on this below). The 10-year Treasury yield tends to be lower when investors are extremely bullish on the U.S. dollar and higher when they are more bearish on the dollar. Looking ahead, we remain optimistic that the most important global growth indicators (Global Manufacturing PMI and dollar bullish sentiment) will soon reverse course, as some leading global growth indicators have recently turned a corner. We already saw that the CRB Raw Industrials index has broken out (Chart 1). Additionally: Chart 4The Worst Is Behind Us? The Global ZEW Economic Sentiment index has risen in two consecutive months (Chart 4, top panel). Our Global LEI Diffusion Index shows that more than half of the countries in our sample now have improving leading economic indicators (Chart 4, panel 2). Our BCA Boom/Bust Indicator – an indicator based on the CRB index, Global Metals equities and U.S. unemployment claims – has also jumped (Chart 4, bottom panel). Ingredient #2: Output Gap As noted above, the 10-year Treasury yield looks too high relative to our preferred economic growth indicators. This could be because yields haven’t yet caught up to the deteriorating global economy, but more likely it is because our bond model is still missing some key ingredients. The next most obvious factor to incorporate into our model is some measure of the output gap. If an economy is operating at very close to its peak capacity, with a small output gap, then it doesn’t take much additional growth to spark inflation. Conversely, even rapid economic growth will not be inflationary if the output gap is large. As long as the central bank is expected to lean against rising inflation with higher interest rates, then some measure of the output gap should be included in our bond model. Unfortunately, appropriate output gap measures are difficult to find. We could rely on the CBO or IMF’s output gap estimates, but those are often subject to large ex-post revisions – not ideal if we want to create a bond model that is useful in real time. Since the Fed tends to lift rates when the output gap closes, another option would be to include the fed funds rate as an independent variable in our model. However, this is also not ideal since we would expect the macroeconomic data and the 10-year yield to lead changes in the policy rate. Some measure of inflation might be the best factor to include. However, we find that the correlation between different price inflation measures and the 10-year Treasury yield is incredibly unstable over time. This is likely because the Fed targets price inflation explicitly, making its correlation with bond yields less empirically apparent. Wage growth is the best “output gap” measure to include in a 10-year Treasury yield model. In fact, our analysis reveals that wage growth is the best “output gap” measure to include in a 10-year Treasury yield model. Specifically, average hourly earnings from the monthly employment report. Not only does the fed funds rate respond – with a lag – to changes in average hourly earnings, but average hourly earnings also line up reasonably well with the 10-year yield over time (Chart 5). Looking at Chart 5, we can now clearly see why the 10-year yield is above its mid-2016 low, despite the poor readings from our growth indicators. Wages have risen sharply since mid-2016, indicating that the output gap has closed, and the Fed has hiked rates 8 times as a result. The obvious conclusion is that in the present situation, with a much smaller output gap than in 2016, it would require a Global Manufacturing PMI well below 50 to produce a 10-year yield near 2% or below. Going forward, we see the uptrend in wage growth continuing for some time. The proportion of workers quitting their jobs each month, a signal of worker bargaining power, remains very high relative to history. Meanwhile, many more households continue to describe jobs as “plentiful” as opposed to “hard to get” (Chart 6). Chart 5Output Gap Ingredient: Average Hourly Earnings Chart 6More Room For Wages To Grow Ingredient #3: Policy Uncertainty The third ingredient we’ll add to our 10-year Treasury yield model is a measure of policy uncertainty. Specifically, the index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty created by Baker, Bloom and Davis.2 Investors often flock to the safety of U.S. Treasuries in times of economic distress. But Treasuries can also benefit from flight-to-quality flows during periods of stable economic growth but heightened political turmoil. In other words, elevated political uncertainty can make investors fear a downturn in the future, and drive a flight into the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index also shows a relatively strong correlation with the 10-year Treasury yield over time (Chart 7). Chart 7Policy Uncertainty Ingredient: Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index Looking more closely at Chart 7, we see that global policy uncertainty is currently as high as it was in mid-2016, when the 10-year Treasury yield hit its cycle low. This lines up pretty well with intuition, since investors are understandably quite nervous about the state of Brexit negotiations and U.S./China trade relations. In that context, it is reasonable to expect that some geopolitical risk premium is currently priced into the 10-year Treasury yield, though a smaller output gap than in 2016 is preventing the 10-year yield from reaching mid-2016 levels. Going forward, though political uncertainty will probably stay elevated compared to history. It seems increasingly likely that a “hard Brexit” will be avoided and that President Trump will seek some sort of agreement with China in advance of the 2020 U.S. election.3 The political risk premium in 10-year notes could unwind somewhat in the coming months. Ingredient #4: Sentiment The fourth and final ingredient we’ll add to our 10-year Treasury yield model is a component related to investor sentiment. Our favorite being the U.S. Economic Surprise Index. Chart 8Sentiment Ingredient: Economic Surprise Index Investors don’t often think of the Surprise index as a sentiment indicator, but in fact that’s exactly what it is. It measures whether the economic data exceeded or fell short of expectations during the past 30 days, a measurement that is heavily influenced by whether investor expectations are optimistic or pessimistic. When economic expectations are extremely downbeat it doesn’t take much good news to generate a positive surprise, and vice-versa. Also, investor expectations are influenced in one direction or the other by whether the recent economic data are positive or negative. This behavioral dynamic causes the Economic Surprise Index to be a mean-reverting series, one that we can even describe with a simple auto-regressive model, as shown in Chart 8. More importantly, we have found that the Economic Surprise Index is tightly correlated with the change in the 10-year Treasury yield. A given month that ends with the Surprise index above zero is usually a month when the 10-year Treasury yield increased, and vice-versa (Chart 9). This correlation also holds relatively well over 3-month and 6-month horizons (Charts 10 & 11), but breaks down beyond that.4 The U.S. data surprise index is deeply negative at present, and has been for several weeks. But the longer the data continue to disappoint, the more downbeat investor expectations become and the more likely it is that the surprise index will rise in the future. Right now, our simple auto-regressive model projects that the surprise index will be slightly higher in one month’s time, though still deeply negative. Nevertheless, the Surprise index suggests we are approaching a turning point in investor sentiment. Mix Well, Cover, Stir Occasionally We’ve now presented what, in our view, is a fairly complete list of factors that should be included in a macroeconomic model of the 10-year Treasury yield. Importantly, each factor complements the other ones in the sense that they each capture a different element of the economic landscape. At this stage, it would be nice to weight all of the factors together and arrive at a fair value estimate for the 10-year yield. Unfortunately, we won’t be performing that exercise in this report (we may do so in the future). The key challenge in combining all of the indicators together is that the sensitivity of the 10-year yield to each of the above factors changes over time. For example, there are periods when policy uncertainty appears to be a very significant driver of the 10-year yield, and other times when it appears to not matter much at all. The macro indicators listed in this report generally signal that the 10-year yield is near its trough. While it is often useful to boil all of the important drivers down into a point estimate of the 10-year yield, such an exercise can also create problems if it causes us to zero-in on the model’s output and avoid thinking critically about what the different macro inputs are telling us. As of today, we think the macro indicators listed above generally signal that the 10-year yield is near its trough. Leading global growth indicators have hooked up, suggesting that the Global Manufacturing PMI will improve during the next few months and that bullish dollar sentiment could soften. Survey indicators suggest that the labor market remains tight, and that wage growth will stay in an uptrend. Policy uncertainty will probably continue to apply some downward pressure to yields, but a long Brexit extension and/or trade agreement between the U.S. and China could cause that impact to wane in the next few months. Economic sentiment is likely quite depressed, meaning that the bar for positive surprises is low. All in all, our investment strategy is unchanged. We recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark duration in U.S. bond portfolios, while focusing short positions on the 5-year and 7-year maturities. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The rationale for tracking the CRB/Gold ratio can be found in U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Search For Aaa Spread”, dated March 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 www.policyuncertainty.com 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Outlook, “From Dead Zone To End Zone”, dated March 29, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Much Higher For Yields?”, dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
The U.S. NFIB small business confidence survey rose marginally from 101.7 to 101.8, falling short of expectations of 102. However, there was an important nugget of information in this dataset. Plans to hire, net compensation, and net compensation plans all…

